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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the prospect of the People’s Liberation Army Navy to gain 
access to naval facilities in Burma and the implications for the Asia-Pacific region.  With 
much of China’s energy resources sailing through the Strait of Malacca, Burma is in a 
strategic position to affect China’s energy security design.  If China were given access to 
port facilities in Burma to service the expanding Chinese naval fleet, it would give PLAN 
the ability to control maritime trade routes as well as the ability to command strategic 
chokepoints along those routes jeopardizing the security interests of the maritime powers 
that depend on these waters.  The increase in PLAN’s capabilities could generate an 
uncertain climate and prompt a build up of rival naval powers in the region.  
This thesis will argue that although the PLA Navy will be able to ply China’s 
extended sea lines of communication with the help of Burmese naval facilities, the 
Chinese naval vessels have not attained sufficient modernization to pose a major threat to 
the United States or the regional powers.  It is also unlikely China would challenge the 
U.S., the current guarantor of freedom of navigation, for dominance of the sea.  The 
danger will come from the regional instability caused by the naval arms race to counter 
the expanded capabilities of the PLA Navy.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
China continues to show dramatic economic growth and import of energy through 
the sea lines of communication is fundamental to maintaining this growth.  The 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests on the continued development of 
its economy and the CCP will use its significant influences to gain access to Burma’s 
naval facilities to assist in securing its sea lines of communication.   
This thesis will explore the feasibility of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s 
(PLAN) aspiration to gain access to Burmese naval facilities and the resultant 
ramifications for the Asia-Pacific region.  The PLAN has been modernizing for the last 
two decades but it will be many more decades before coming close to achieving the 
capabilities of the U.S. naval forces.  Even with access to naval facilities in Burma, the 
Chinese Navy will not pose a substantial threat to the United States or the regional 
powers.  The danger will come from the instability caused by the regional naval arms 
race stemming from the perceived threat of the PLAN to affect the energy security of its 
neighbors.    
B. CHINA’S RISING ECONOMIC POWER 
China represents a rising economic power with growing influence in the Asia-
Pacific region as well as the world.  In 2006, China’s gross domestic product grew by 
10.7 percent to reach US$2.68 trillion  and is rapidly closing the gap with Germany, the 
world’s third largest economy at US$2.86 trillion.1   This is a far cry from the centrally 
planned economy prior to the 1979 economic reform, which averaged only  
                                                 
1 Xu Binglan. “China’s GDP Grows 10.7% in 2006, Fastest in 11 Years.” China Daily (18 March 
2007) http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/26/content_793128.htm (accessed 17 May 2007). 
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5.3 percent.2  This sustained growth is also strengthening the economies of its trading 
partners in the Asia-Pacific and around the world.   
From the initiation of its economic reform in 1979 to the present, the size of 
China’s economy grew eleven-fold while per capita GDP increased eight-fold.3  China 
now routinely trades with the United States, Japan, European Union, and any other 
country that can advance its economic growth.  China’s economic reach extends around 
the world and its thriving economy is also benefiting many of the countries around the 
Asia-Pacific region.  Many in the region shifted their businesses to China to take 
advantage of its faster economic growth and more open market.  World wide foreign 
direct investment in China surged from US$636 million in 1983 to $72.4 billion by 
2005.4  In 2005, Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States made up the top three largest 
overall investors in China at US$17.9 billion, $6.5 billion, and $3.1 billion respectively.5  
In 2006, China is the world’s fifth largest exporter with 80 percent of the world’s 
consumer electronics made in China.6   
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, communism lost credibility as an ideology 
that perpetuated a defective economic system.  The “reform and open” policies of 1979 
brought unprecedented growth and prosperity to China.  The leadership of the People’s 
Republic of China now stakes its legitimacy and power on the continued vitality of its 
semi-capitalist economy.  
C. CHINESE NAVAL MODERNIZATION 
In addition to its growing economy, China also has one of the biggest military 
modernization programs in the world.  Since the early 1990s, the growth of China’s 
                                                 
2 Wayne Morrison. China’s Economic Conditions (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
12 July 2006), 3. 
3 Wayne Morrison. China’s Economic Conditions (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
12 July 2006), 3. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 “Quick Guide: China’s Economic Reform.” BBC News (3 November 2006) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5237748.stm (accessed 18 May 2007). 
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defense budget has been in the double digits each year, and next year promises to be 
more of the same.  The 2007 Chinese defense budget was reported to increase by 14.7 
percent this year to approximately US$35 billion, equal to approximately 1.5% of 
China’s GDP.7  With modernization moving swiftly, PLAN will eventually be able to 
project naval power beyond the South China Sea.  Combine this with unhampered access 
to Burma for ship replenishment and repairs, and China will be able to extend its 
influence well into the Indian Ocean.  
Traditionally, China has viewed its Navy as only a defensive force to protect its 
littoral.  In the latter half of the 1990s, China began modernizing the PLAN to enhance 
capabilities beyond that of coastal defense.  Today, the Chinese Navy is close to 
achieving a force that can project power across the vastness of the South China Sea.  
PLAN’s naval modernization program is moving ahead with an ambitious, simultaneous 
acquisition of five different classes of submarines.  They are armed with a myriad of 
advanced torpedoes, assorted cruise missiles and even ballistic missiles that could be 
equipped with nuclear warheads.  Four classes of submarines are produced indigenously; 
two of them are nuclear-powered designs, the Jin class ballistic missile submarine and the 
Shang class attack submarine, while the Yuan and the Song are the conventional diesel-
electric attack submarines.  Eight Kilo-class conventional attack submarines have also 
been purchased from Russia to round out the new set of submarines being produced or 
acquired by the PLAN.8  By the end of the decade, PLAN forces may consist of 40 
additional new submarines that will replace its aging fleet.9  Although the technology is 
old by U.S. standards, China has substantially increased the capabilities of its submarine 
fleet.  
                                                 
7  Donald Rumsfeld. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2006 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 18.  http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html 
(accessed 24 May 2006). 
8  Ronald O’Rourke. China Naval Modernization, 6-7. and John J. Tkacik, Jr. “Panda Hedging: 
Pentagon Report Urges New Strategy for China.” Heritage Foundation (24 May 2006) 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific /wm1093.cfm (accessed 12 August 2006). 
9  Richard Fisher Jr.  “China’s Submarines Pose Regional Threat.” Armed Forces 143, no. 8 (2006): 
33.  
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Concurrent with the modernization of the submarine forces, the PLAN is 
modernizing its surface combat ships.  Since the beginning of the 1990s, China has 
purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia in addition to building and 
deploying eight new classes of destroyers and frigates.10  The last of the four Russian 
built Sovremenny-class destroyers, designed specifically to counter the U.S. carrier battle 
groups and the Aegis destroyers, will be delivered by the end of the year.11  The 
Sovremenny-class destroyers bring to the PLAN a longer cruising range of up to 14,000 
miles, as well as more lethal weapon systems, which will allow the PLAN to extend its 
reach to the Persian Gulf.  Smaller craft with high technology advanced hull designs are 
also emerging in China’s fast attack craft inventory.   
PLAN is also modernizing its amphibious fleet, which will be crucial if China 
were to contemplate the invasion of Taiwan.  The new classes of amphibious ships 
include the Yuting II-class helicopter-capable tank landing ship (LST) that can transport 
10 tanks and 250 troops, the Yunshu-class landing ship (LSM) that can transport 6 tanks 
or 250 tons of supplies, and the Yubei-class utility landing craft (LCU) that can transport 
10 tanks and 150 soldiers.12  Of the three new classes of amphibious ships, 19 
amphibious ships and 8 amphibious landing craft have been delivered by 2004.13   
In addition to the combat and amphibious vessels, China is steadily improving its 
ability to refuel and re-supply its long-range maritime operations.  Most PLAN combat 
vessels now carry the required equipment to transfer fuel and supplies underway.  As of 
the year 2000, China’s support ships consists of three replenishment ships, 29 supply 
ships, three repair ships and six submarine support ships with additional three 
replenishment ships, three supply ships, and two repair ships under construction.14  With 
the completion of the above ships, China’s support fleet may rival the mid-sized 
European navies, such as the French or the British, in extending the global reach of its 
                                                 
10 Richard Fisher Jr. “PLAN for Growth.” Armed Forces Journal 143, no. 9 (2006): 12.  
11 Ibid., 30. 
12 Ronald O’Rourke. China Naval Modernization, 82. 
13 Ibid., 15. 
14 Thomas Kane. Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002), 78. 
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combat vessels.  Very few nations have ever undertaken such a robust modernization of 
their naval combat power in such short a time.   
D. CHINA’S MOTIVES 
In analyzing the implications of the modernization of PLAN, China’s 
international politics needs to also be addressed.  A tally of naval hardware China is 
developing or acquiring from various sources without broader analysis is meaningless.  
Three major schools of thought permeate the literature on Chinese military 
modernization, particularly the naval component.  The first and most provocative 
perspective is that China is striving toward regional or world hegemony.  The second 
perspective is that China desires to generate the capabilities to deter or slow the United 
States in a Taiwan attack scenario.15  The last perspective is that China is modernizing its 
navy in order to protect its vital energy lines of communication in order to sustain its 
economic growth.  The three perspectives are complementary in nature but the failure to 
protect energy supplies to sustain economic growth has the most potential to destabilize 
the legitimacy of the CCP’s political power.   
1. Regional Hegemony 
Due to the rapid and aggressive pace of military modernization, the 2006 U.S. 
Quadrennial Defense Review, for the first time, addressed China as a potential military 
competitor.  In the regional hegemony school of thought, the authors Timperlake and 
Triplett, in the book Red Dragon Rising, assert that China is prepared to disrupt, if not 
directly challenge, U.S. military might.16  Regional hegemony as China’s aspiration was  
                                                 
15 Donald Rumsfeld. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2006 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 38. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html 
(accessed May 24, 2006). 
16 Edward Timperlake and William Triplett II. Red Dragon Rising (Washington DC: Regnery 
Publishing Inc., 1999), 14. 
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also addressed by Steven Mosher, who asserts that China is acquiring offensive weapons 
in “anticipation of a contest with the current guarantor of regional security, the United 
States.”17  
The Chinese military has placed great emphasis on PLAN’s ability to interdict 
carrier battle groups and expeditionary strike groups at long ranges through cunning use 
of submarines and recently acquired destroyers.18  Combining this capability with 
improved ballistic missile technology gives China a credible force projection means to 
deny an adversary the ability to operate in the region.19  The capabilities and views 
discussed in this school of thought paint a bleak picture of China continuing to modernize 
in order to become the regional, if not world, hegemon.20  
2. Taiwan Scenario  
The People’s Republic of China is adamant that Taiwan is a part of its territory 
but Taiwan repudiates Beijing’s claim of sovereignty.  Due to the political dynamics and 
strong national identity of Taiwan, the prospects of a political reunification will remain a 
challenge.21  If Taiwan cannot be reunited via peaceful means, Beijing does not discount 
the right to use military to force a reunification with Taiwan.22  
Taiwan lies across the approximately 100 nautical mile strait notorious for foul 
weather.  The PLAN amphibious fleet of fewer than 100 ships can land a force of only 
                                                 
17 Steven Mosher. China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World Hegemon (San Francisco, CA: 
Encounter Books, 2000), 95. 
18 Donald Rumsfeld. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2006 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 24. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html 
(accessed May 24, 2006). 
19 Ibid., 25. 
20 Bill Gertz. “China’s Emergence as Military Power Splits Strategists on Threat to U.S.” The 
Washington Times Sec: Nation/Politics (7 February 2006) http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/ 
20060206-102324-3179r.htm (accessed 15 August 2006); Bill Gertz. “More Muscle, with Eye on China.” 
The Washington Times Sec: Nation/Politics (10 April 2006) 
www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060420-104400-0013r.htm (accessed 24 July 2006). 
21 John J. Tkacik, Jr. “Panda Hedging: Pentagon Report Urges New Strategy for China.” Heritage 
Foundation (24 May 2006) http://www.heritage.org/Research/ AsiaandthePacific/wm1093.cfm (accessed 
12 August 2006). 
22 Stephen Flanagan and Michael Marti. The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition 
(Washington D.C., NDU Press Publications, 2003), 119. 
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one division, approximately 10,000-14,000 men with their equipment.23  Assuming this 
force conducts a successful amphibious landing, it would face upwards of 100,000 
defenders in a short amount of time.  The reinforcement rate is likewise dismal: 
approximately 8,000 troops per day assuming all means of transport are used.24 
To rectify this shortcoming, PLAN continues to modernize and enlarge its 
combatant as well as its amphibious fleet.  The goal is to quickly acquire a good mix of 
“economic-diplomatic carrots and military sticks sufficient to reassert the credibility of 
its military threat and deter or prevent Taiwan from achieving permanent formal 
separation.”25  This school of thought argues that China will continue to modernize and 
bide its time until it gains enough strength to challenge the United States in order to 
obtain reunification on Beijing’s terms.26  
The People’s Republic of China remains vigilant in its dealings with Taiwan.  
Beijing allows Taiwan to chart its own course so long as it does not attempt to vie for 
independence.   Most nations around the world acknowledge that there is only one China 
and that Taiwan is an internal issue.  Reunification with Taiwan continues to rank among 
the PRC’s highest priorities, but so long as Taiwan does not pursue independence Beijing 
will likely continue the peaceful status quo.   
3. Energy Resources Security 
China’s extraordinary economic growth is creating a nearly insatiable appetite for 
energy in the form of oil, coal and natural gas.  In the last decade, the demand for energy 
                                                 
23 Thomas Kane. Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002), 91. 
24 Michael O’Hanlon. “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan.” International Security 25, No 2 (Fall 
2000): 68. 
25 James Mulvenon. Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the 
Department of Defense (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006). 
26 There are various course of actions contemplated in various literatures: Alan Collins. Security and 
Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003); Bernard Cole. The Great Wall at Sea 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery. The Rise of 
China and its Effect on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2006); Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton, and Kuah Kuhn Eng, eds. Where 
China Meets Southeast Asia (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Liselotte Odgaard. Maritime 
Security between China and Southeast Asia (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002). 
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surpassed domestic sources of supply and in 1993 China became a net oil importer.27  
That year, China abandoned its policy of energy self-sufficiency in favor of a policy that 
seeks to diversify the sources of its energy supply.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Illustration of China’s Vital Sea Lines of Communication.28 
 
Energy provides the foundation of China’s mammoth economy and the protection 
of its sea lines of communication represents one of Beijing’s greatest strategic 
                                                 
27 Erica Downs. China’s Quest for Energy Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006). 
28 Donald Rumsfeld. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2006 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 33. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html 
(accessed 24 May 2006). 
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concerns.29  China’s increasing dependence on overseas trade and imported oil impart the 
PLAN with a vital mission of providing maritime security of the sea lines of 
communication.  The protection of China’s energy resources, along with the sea lines of 
communication, represent the more realistic motive driving the extensive modernization 
of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.  
a. Sources of Energy 
Since 1992, the dismal long term prospects for self sufficient domestic 
production of energy has led China to seek stable energy resources abroad with equity 
positions in established oil fields.30  Investment in equity shares was deemed less risky 
and far less costly than new field exploration.  Equity share ownership also eliminates the 
middleman and provides a certain amount of price stability with added security than 
buying oil on the international markets.   
In an effort to diversify its sources of energy, China established relations 
with a variety of oil producers, including repressive regimes with terrible human rights 
records.  China entered into long-term oil supply arrangements with several Gulf States to 
include Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.  Iran alone accounts for over 11 percent of 
China’s imported oil that will only increase with its recent contract for US$70 billion 
worth of oil and natural gas.31  Today, approximately 58 percent of imported oil 
originates from the Persian Gulf region and is forecasted to rise to 70 percent by 2015.32  
Due to prospects of long-term instability in the Middle East, China also 
turned to Africa as another major source of imported oil.  In November 2006, Beijing 
hosted 48 out of the 53 African heads of state in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
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and struck billions of dollars worth of energy-related deals.33  Africa supplies almost 30 
percent of China’s crude oil today and has the potential to supplant the Middle East as 
China’s primary source of imported oil and natural gas in the future.34  Less than two 
months after the FOCAC, Chinese President Hu Jintao led a high level delegation on a 
12-day tour encompassing eight African countries to publicly reaffirm and strengthen 
Chinese ties with the African Nations to ensure the continued flow of oil and gas.35  
b. Transportation of Energy 
In addition to diversifying the sources of oil suppliers, China varied the 
manner in which oil and gas are transported to its domestic markets due to supply 
security concerns.  Long distance pipelines and sea transport are two of the main 
techniques to transfer energy.  Transnational pipelines have been a crucial ambition for 
the Chinese because they are protected by territorial politics.  Although the pipelines may 
be susceptible to U.S. air strikes or sabotage, Beijing is relying on the fact that the United 
States will not likely violate another country’s sovereignty simply to sever the flow of 
energy to China.  The host nation will bring tremendous political pressure against the 
United States to safeguard the pipeline that is bringing enormous economic benefits to 
that country.  
China is investing billions of dollars to build transnational pipelines with 
the aim of taking advantage of the political protection provided by the partner nations.  
As of July 2006, the US$700 million, 613-mile-long Kazakhstan-China pipeline is 
pumping 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Atasu in northwestern Kazakhstan to 
Alashankou in China’s northwestern Xinjiang region.36  There are plans to double the 
capacity to transfer 400,000 bbl/d by 2010.  Russia is constructing a 2,500 mile pipeline 
that will reach Skovorodino, a town only 30 miles from the Chinese border.  From there, 
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a pipeline spur to Daqing will transfer as much as 600,000 bbl/d to China from Russia’s 
Eastern Siberia region with up to 75 billion barrels of potential oil reserves.37  In April 
2006, Beijing approved a study to look at the feasibility of circumventing the Strait of 
Malacca by constructing a new pipeline that would link one of Burma’s deep-sea ports to 
the interior of China.38 
Transnational pipelines offer a measure of diversity but the reality is that 
the majority of China’s imported oil and natural gas travels via large transport ships along 
established commercial shipping routes.  In 2005, China imported 121.55 million tons of 
crude oil39 via ocean-going tankers, representing 93.5 percent of total oil imports.40  The 
other 6.5 percent of oil was imported via rail lines.   
In 2010, the transnational pipelines are expected to transfer 15 percent 
while the ocean-going tankers will transport approximately 83 percent of the imported 
oil.41  Although the percentage transported by seaborne carriers will decrease, the overall 
demand for foreign oil is increasing substantially.  By 2010, China’s total oil demand is 
expected to rise to 380 million tons of crude oil with 200 million tons coming from  
foreign sources.42  The ocean-going tankers will bear the responsibility of transporting 
approximately 166 million tons of crude oil, a sizeable increase in tonnage despite the 
diversified transport methods.   
Energy provides the foundation of China’s mammoth economy and the 
protection of its sea lines of communication represents one of its greatest strategic 
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concerns.43  With the dependence on the continued growth of the economy, nothing 
would be more debilitating than an interruption of energy supplies that could directly 
contribute to a drastic decline of its economy.   
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF BURMA 
Burma is situated south of China, east of India across the Bay of Bengal and 
strategically situated at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, the vital connection for 
majority of the seaborne international trade with Asia.  This strategic location provides a 
commanding position over the sea lines of communications for the petroleum and 
petroleum products that feed the insatiable appetite of the Chinese economy.  Due to 
China’s close relationship with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the 
military junta ruling Burma, the Chinese Navy may be able to deploy in and around 
Burma with few or no restrictions.  
Since the early 1990s, Burma has faced extensive sanctions by Western countries, 
yet it has been able to sustain its economy and build up its military due in large part to 
China’s financial, political, and military support.  China-Burma bilateral trade volume 
nearly doubled from 2002 to 2005 with China importing raw materials while Burma 
received finished products to sustain its economy.44   
In addition to the expanding trade and military aid between China and Burma, 
there are purportedly listening posts and missile-tracking stations in the Coco Islands, 
Burmese deep-water port of Kyaukpyu on the Bay of Bengal and port facilities along 
Burma’s littoral at Hainggyi and Ramree Islands.45  Although the listening posts and 
missile-tracking stations are clandestine in nature, infrastructure improvements to include 
the port facilities are well documented.  Millions of dollars and the expertise of many 
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Chinese engineers have been made available to help construct roads, jetties, port 
facilities, runways, and radar stations throughout Burma.   
President Jiang Zemin even paid a visit to Burma in December 2001 emphasizing 
the critical role Burma plays in the future of China’s Navy.46  If Burma permits China to 
build more robust facilities to support PLAN vessels, Burma stands to gain much more 
financial and military aid than it currently enjoys.  With much of China’s energy 
resources sailing through the Strait of Malacca, Burma is in a strategic position to affect 
China’s energy security design.  If China were to gain access to port facilities in Burma 
to service the expanding Chinese naval fleet, it would be able to extend its influence well 
into the Indian Ocean.   
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND THE UNITED STATES 
Like many countries in Southeast Asia, the U.S. is concerned about the prospects 
of growing Chinese naval power.  Currently, PLAN can do little more than protect 
China’s littoral.  The water around Taiwan and its immediate periphery seem to be the 
limit of PLAN’s sea denial capability.47  With continued upgrades to PLAN, this scenario 
will change in the future.  Bases or commercial ports that allow combat vessels to refuel 
and rearm in Burma would considerably increase the cruising range of PLAN.  This will 
effectively allow PLAN to operate in and around the Indian Ocean and may pose 
challenges to all the inhabitants of the region as well as the interests of the United States. 
When looking at the capabilities of PLAN, China does not appear to seek 
hegemony.  Ensuring the security of energy supplies to allow China’s economy to 
prosper also allows the CCP to maintain its hold on its powers.  Burma could play a 
critical role in this by extending the range of PLAN’s combat vessels to be able to escort 
merchant vessels to the Persian Gulf and back.  The existing literature glosses over the 
potential importance of Burma as a way station that would more than double the cruising 
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range of the existing PLAN vessels, primarily the older destroyers and the majority of the 
frigates.  Most of the destroyers and frigates have a range of approximately 4,000 miles 
that would allow them to only make a round trip to the southern entrance of the Strait of 
Malacca.48  With access to the ports in Burma, these same ships could effectively leap 
ahead in their capabilities to extend their reach well into the Indian Ocean.   
If the PLAN increased its patrols along its sea lines of communication, through 
the use of ports in Burma, this could be in conflict with the U.S. mission of being the 
guarantor of the world sea lines of communication.  The PLAN will likely encounter a 
U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean leading to apprehension 
amongst the regional powers that also ply these waters to secure their energy resources, 
such as Japan, South Korea, and India.  The increased Chinese military presence in these 
regional waters would produce anxieties for the maritime powers of the region and a 
regional arms race may ensue.     
G. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis will apply qualitative and quantitative analysis to research data culled 
from primary and secondary sources.  The analyses will be presented in five chapters.  
The introduction will put into context the scope of this thesis.  Burma’s close relationship 
with China and its strategic benefits for PLAN will be analyzed in chapter two.  For 
nearly two decades, there has been comprehensive military, economic, and political 
cooperation between Burma and China.  An examination will be made of Burma’s 
willingness to allow China to gain access to Burmese naval bases.  This will be followed 
in chapter three by an assessment of PLAN modernization in terms of hardware and 
capabilities.  The fourth chapter will analyze the regional implications of PLAN’s 
possible access to naval facilities in Burma.  The conclusion will provide policy 
recommendations for the regional powers and the United States to alleviate the growing 
risks associated with the potential of China gaining access to Burmese naval facilities.    
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II. BURMA AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO PLAN 
A. BURMA’S STRATEGIC LOCATION 
Burma is situated south of China, east of India across the Bay of Bengal and near 
the entrance of the Strait of Malacca, a vital connection that enables transit of over 80 
percent of China’s imported oil.49  Gaining access to naval facilities in Burma represents 
an economical solution to securing its sea lines of communication without having to 
heavily invest in building up a blue water navy.  Underway replenishment vessels are 
being built to extend the range of the existing Chinese naval fleet but they require some 
years before the numbers become sufficient to allow for regular deployments out of the 
Asia-Pacific region.  No longer will PLAN vessels be stymied by the inefficient practice 
of returning to homeports to refuel, instead can make port calls in Burma on their way to 
the Persian Gulf. 
The double-digit growth of the economy in the past two decades has fueled the 
insatiable appetite for energy and China has now outstripped Japan as the second largest 
oil consumer after the United States.  Of the 6.5 million barrels per day required to meet 
China’s energy needs, almost half of the oil is imported from foreign sources, 
predominantly from the Persian Gulf.50   
The concentration of so much imported oil sailing through the Strait of Malacca 
presents security concerns for the PRC.  The Strait of Malacca is a narrow waterway with 
an entrance of only 1.5 nautical miles across and provides a natural chokepoint for the 
hundreds of vessels that transit the strait each day.  In November 2003, President Hu 
Jintao even stated, “certain powers [have] encroached on and tried to control the  
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navigation route through the strait.”51  Without the PLAN to provide escort for the 
tankers, Beijing has to rely on the “certain powers” to provide security of its oil 
shipments, namely the United States.   
B. BENEFITS OF PLAN’S ACCESS TO NAVAL FACILITIES IN BURMA 
Burma sits at the northern entrance of the Strait of Malacca and is halfway from 
the Persian Gulf to the Chinese ports in the South China Sea.  The ability to refuel and re-
supply in Burmese naval facilities would enhance PLAN’s capacity to traverse the entire 
sea lines of communication.  Beijing will no longer have to depend on the United States 
or other sea powers to guarantee freedom of navigation throughout Asia.   
China’s dependence on the United States as the sole guarantor of freedom of 
navigation causes much concern for the PRC.  Beijing depends on economic growth to 
maintain power and keep its population pliant.  In order to continue its fantastic economic 
growth, China requires tremendous sums of energy.  Disruption of its imported oil could 
stymie China’s economic development and cause unrest in the general population.  The 
resultant instability could challenge the communist leadership legitimacy.   
For the sake of maintaining Chinese strategic and economic advantage provided 
by the stable influence of the United States, Beijing has not openly challenged the U.S. 
naval dominance in Asia.  The PRC has instead been quietly modernizing its military, 
with emphasis on its naval and strategic forces.  With time and continued investment in 
developing the naval capabilities, the PLAN will be able to secure its sea lines of 
communication in the distant future.  
Chinese naval vessels’ range is presently limited by its necessity to return to 
homeport to refuel and replenish its stores.  At present, there are not enough underway 
replenishment vessels to allow for regular deployments outside of the South China Sea.  
Although long distance routine deployment is a distant prospect, access to naval facilities 
in Burma could extend the range of existing Chinese naval vessels well into the Indian 
Ocean to provide security for the vital sea lines of communication.  Burma’s naval 
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facilities can also serve as a safe haven for PLAN vessels to conduct operations in and 
around the Strait of Malacca to safeguard China’s interest in the region.  The Burmese 
naval facilities represent an inexpensive solution to extending the range of the PLAN 
deployments.  
The Burmese naval facilities would allow Beijing to project power and influence 
events in the Indian Ocean.  Thus far, the Indian Ocean has been the domain of the 
United States and the Indian Navy.  Access to ports in the Coco and Hainggyi Islands 
would put the PLAN vessels within 30 nautical miles of the Andaman Islands in India.  
This new capability would allow the PLAN to constrain the expanding influence of the 
Indian and the United States navies in the region. 
C. PLAN ACCESS TO BURMESE NAVAL FACILITIES 
The People’s Republic of China has made progress in gaining access to naval 
facilities in Burma.  The People’s Liberation Army Navy has not overtly utilized 
Burmese naval facilities, instead has provided technical expertise and financial assistance 
in building Burma’s port facilities at strategic locations.52  Given enough time with 
continued economic and political collaboration, China will be able to persuade the 
Burmese government to allow PLAN to make port calls to the same facilities it helped 
build in Burma.   
The Coco Island is situated approximately 400 nautical miles north of the 
entrance of the Strait of Malacca and just 30 nautical miles south of India’s Andaman 
Islands.53  Coco Island supports a Burmese military base with an airport and a large 
landing jetty for its naval vessels.  In 2003, the PRC contributed US$11 million and some 
engineers to construct the large landing jetty and expanded the capabilities of the base.54  
The landing jetty measures 85 meters by 70 meters and can dock most of the vessels in 
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the PLAN’s inventory.55  China also helped to extend the runway from 4,400 to 5,000 
feet to accommodate slightly heavier and more capable aircraft.56  
The base is purported to be a joint intelligence center to monitor India’s rocket 
telemetry data as well as to observe the naval activities in the Indian Ocean, especially 
the U.S. and the Indian navies.57  The electronic signals intelligence/signals intelligence 
(ELINT/SIGINT) equipments were Chinese made and operated by Chinese naval 
personnel.58   
In southern Burma, St Luke’s Island (also known as Zadetkale Island) sits across 
from Thailand’s Ranong Province, less than 200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait.  
The Burmese Navy operates out of this base and installed a radar station there with the 
help of Chinese engineers.  The construction of the radar station took approximately one 
year and was completed in February of 2001.59  This radar equipped naval base will be 
able to support PLAN’s submarine operations in the vicinity of the Strait of Malacca as 
well as service and refuel the surface vessels.60 
China is helping Burma construct a deep-water port on Ramree Island located 
approximately 60 miles south of Sittwe, near India.  When complete, this port will be 
able to service oil tankers and naval vessels of various sizes.61  This base will be crucial 
in collecting intelligence on air and naval movements in the Bay of Bengal.62  The base 
will also be vital as a hub for transportation of the imported oil if an overland pipeline 
can be constructed connecting the Ramree port to the interior of China, relieving some of 
China’s reliance on the Strait of Malacca.    
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In the beginning of this decade, the PRC helped improve facilities in a number of 
other Burmese naval bases.  China modernized and expanded the naval base at Sittwe 
located near Bangladesh.  Financial support was provided to improve the deepwater port 
at Thilowa, near Rangoon, by routing the funds through Hong Kong.63  The Mergui naval 
base located across from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the naval facilities in 
Hainggik were also upgraded with the help from the PRC.64 
All the modernization of the Burmese port facilities comes not from the 
benevolence of the Chinese government.  The port facilities have been improved to 
accommodate the Burmese Navy, of which most of the vessels have been imported from 
China.  The similar facility designs will make it effortless for PLAN vessels to make port 
calls in the future.   
China remains one of Burma’s largest trading partners as well as a political shield.  
In spite of its recent economic diversification, Burma can ill afford to substantially 
degrade its economy by offending China.  The PRC may use this fact, along with 
economic incentives, as leverage to coax Burma into opening up its ports to PLAN 
vessels.  China could also give other incentives by offering higher quality military 
equipment if it does not first cut off Burma’s largest supply of military hardware.  
Ultimately, Burma cannot afford to lose the only friend with a veto power in the United 
Nations Security Council leaving it politically defenseless against the western nations.   
 Until the time of China’s choosing to gain access to Burmese ports, the PRC will 
continue to maintain close ties with Burma. The PLAN will persist in constructing and 
modernizing its naval fleet to defend its homeland as well as secure its sea lines of 
communication.  The PRC will continue to modernize Burmese naval facilities in 
anticipation of using them for port of calls by PLAN vessels in the foreseeable future.  
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D. PRC FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD BURMA 
In 1949, Burma was the first non-communist country to establish relations and 
publicly recognize the People’s Republic of China after the Chinese Communist Party 
came to power.  Since then, the two countries have had a relatively close relationship.  
Since the 1990s, the PRC has used its influence, especially in the United Nations Security 
Council, to protect Burma against international criticisms and also provided much needed 
economic and military assistance.  In return, China has been able to gain access to 
Burma’s natural resources, develop trade routes for its southwest provinces (Yunnan and 
Sichuan) and open lines of communication to the Indian Ocean.   
On August 8, 1988, there was a nationwide uprising against the Burmese 
government.  During this “8888” revolt, the PRC was supportive of the military junta and 
deflected human-rights criticisms from the international community.  Beijing prevented 
the adoption of the first draft resolution condemning the human-rights practices of 
Burma.65  Burma reciprocated by lending its support to China after the Tiananmen 
Square incident.   
Subsequently, another large-scale repression occurred against the Democratic 
opposition by the Burmese military junta and the United Stated imposed a stringent 
embargo on May 20, 1997.  The embargo prohibited new investments in Burma by U.S. 
persons.66  Many other Western countries joined the embargo to condemn Burma’s 
human rights violations as well as the repression of the democratic opposition.  This 
effectively isolated the country from the international community and Chinese aid 
became tantamount to Burma’s survival.  By 1998, the Burmese reserves fell to US$90 
million and faced a balance-of-payments crisis.  China immediately provided a loan of 
$150 million to keep Burma’s economy afloat.67  Since then, China has kept the SPDC a 
viable entity through many generous aid packages.   
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On January 12, 2007, the PRC once again protected Burma by vetoing the UNSC 
draft resolution to compel the military junta to release all political prisoners, stop the 
military repression against ethnic minorities and to make progress toward democratic 
governance.68  The United States and the United Kingdom argued that Burma was a 
threat to the international community due to its widespread drug trade, refugee flow 
across international borders, and pervasive human rights abuses.  China asserted these 
were sovereign issues and did not pose a threat to the international community.  
In return, Burma provided China the much-needed opportunity to develop the 
landlocked provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces.  The infrastructure projects, 
such as building roads, bridges, and power stations, have helped China penetrate 
economically into the border regions of Burma.69  Chinese companies exploited these 
opportunities by extracting natural resources, such as lumber, natural gas, minerals, and 
gem stones, at better than wholesale prices.   
Purchase of some of the vast reserves of oil and natural gas has been one of 
China’s most prominent investments in Burma.  In January 2006, China signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Burma to obtain, over a 30-year interval, 6.5 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas from the A-1 block of the Shwe gas field located in the Bay of 
Bengal.70  The A-1 block has approximately 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 
promises to generate upward of US$12 billion for the Burmese military junta over the life 
of the gas deposit.71  The PRC is also interested in developing much of the rest of the 
89.7 trillion cubic feet of Burma’s natural gas resources to feed its insatiable appetite for 
energy.72   
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Alignment with Burma has also given Beijing a relatively secure border and an 
advocate of China in South East Asia.  Having an ally in the south allowed the PRC to 
divert some of its resources that would have gone toward safeguarding its border with 
Burma.  Burma consistently supported China and provided a sympathetic voice in 
ASEAN and many other related organizations.   
The continued good relation with Burma also has the benefit of balancing against 
India, the regional power in the Indian Ocean.  China is apprehensive about being 
encircled by the West and Burma acts as a valuable buffer state.  Burma also provides 
good locations to monitor Indian naval and air force movements as well as the 
movements of all the major powers plying the Indian Ocean.  
E. PRC ASSISTANCE TO BURMA  
Beijing is using diplomatic, economic, and military channels to persuade Burma 
to open up its naval facilities to the People’s Liberation Army Navy.  As one of the first 
countries the PRC established relations with, Burma has enjoyed considerable benefits 
from a close association with China.73  Beijing will use this close relationship, along with 
economic and military enticements, to curry Burma’s favor for the use of its naval ports.   
The “brotherly” relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Burma 
has lasted over the decades and has helped Burma a great deal in times of need.  In 1988, 
the combination of an abysmal economy and crushing of a pro-democracy movement 
turned Burma into a pariah state.  China was the only major power that not only 
maintained ties with Burma, but strengthened relations across all channels that kept the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the ruling military junta, in power.   
High-level contacts have been an important part of the diplomatic relationship 
between China and Burma.  As recently as 30 October 2006 during the Nanning Summit 
between the PRC and ASEAN, Premier Wen Jiabao held a bilateral meeting with 
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Burmese Prime Minister General Soe Win.74  They vowed to continue friendly relations 
without interfering in each other’s internal affairs.  
Win also thanked the Chinese government for its continual support in the United 
Nations Security Council.  Due to the Chinese veto power, Burma feels relatively secure 
that the United States and the international community will not be able to authorize UN 
sponsored military action against the military junta, ostensibly to restore democracy.  In 
return, China gains a friendly voice as well as a supportive vote in the regional forums.    
A friendly relationship with China also garnered tremendous economic benefits 
for Burma over the years.  China is Burma’s largest investor as well as a steady source of 
economic aid and low-interest loans. In June 2006, Beijing loaned US$200 million to 
Burma that were divided amongst five government ministries.75  In February 2006, 
Burma received a loan of US$85 million to procure two new oilrigs to extract natural 
gas.76  These loans, along with grants and aid, have helped buoy Burma’s stagnant 
economy. 
In addition to aid and loans, Burma has a thriving bilateral trade with China.  
Burma imports consumer goods, machinery, electrical equipment, construction materials 
and medicines while China obtains timber, natural gas, and precious stones.  China-
Burma bilateral trade volume grew from US$845 million in 2002 to US$1.209 billion in 
2005.77  In order to further cultivate this thriving trade, Burma has obtained help from 
China in constructing a road that connects the Yunnan Province with a port on the  
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Irrawaddy River.78  In addition to furthering development for Burma, this road will foster 
more economic growth in the Yunnan Province, one of the interior areas that lag behind 
the coastal provinces in China.   
Chinese engineers are poised to construct a US$2 billion gas pipeline from Sittwe, 
Burma to Kunming, potentially relieving the security vulnerability of the tanker fleet 
transporting the vital oil shipments to China.  The gas pipeline is estimated to be 
complete by 2009 and will relieve the energy requirements of interior China.79  The 
pipeline will diversify Beijing’s method of oil transport instead of depending on its 
vulnerable tanker fleet to transit the Malacca Strait choke point to reach China’s east-
coast ports.     
In its bilateral relationship, Burma can ill afford to lose China as a trading partner, 
especially in the midst of international economic sanctions.  The $1.209 billion trade with 
China is a substantial part of the over $5 billion total trade for Burma.80  In contrast, trade 
with Burma is negligible in comparison to China’s total world trade.  China even forgave 
some of its loans to Burma in order to demonstrate good will toward its neighbor.  All 
these acts of good will are investments that build up political as well as economic capital 
that Beijing may cash in for future concessions, such as the access to naval ports in 
Burma.   
The close political and economic ties between Burma and China also strengthen 
the Burmese military junta, the State Peace and Development Council, the successor to 
the SLORC.  China is Burma’s leading supplier of sophisticated military equipment, 
including fighter jets, naval vessels, armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces that 
equal to over 90 percent of arms imported.81  Beijing has sold over US$1.6 billion worth 
of weapons to help modernize and triple the size of Burma’s military from just a decade 
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ago.82  The increase in the size and capabilities of the Burmese military has turned Burma 
into one of the most militarized states in Southeast Asia.  So long as the generals continue 
to remain friendly to China, Beijing will continue to supply these weapons and military 
aids.  This is a reciprocal relationship since the Burmese generals know that military 
might is the only thing keeping them in power.    
F. BURMESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE PRC 
1. Economic and Political Diversification 
The military junta is beholden to China for its help in consolidating power but 
Burma remains very nationalistic and will resist attempts to become a client state.  The 
Burmese military junta will continue to favor China for its economic, political, and 
military benefits but not at the price of losing its sovereignty.  Burma’s desire to exercise 
latitude in its foreign affairs is revealed by the military junta bolstering relations with 
other regional countries. 
Burma’s admission to ASEAN in 1997 and marked its reentry into the 
international community.  Burma is now a member of many regional and international 
organizations, including the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations.  Bilateral trading partners have 
also expanded to include Thailand, Singapore and many of the Asian countries.  In 2004, 
Thailand alone had 49 private projects in Burma worth US$1.29 billion and imports from 
Burma valued at $1.06 billion.83  Singapore also made US$1.4 billion worth of 
investments in 2004.84  
Today, Burma is pursuing closer economic and political cooperation with India, a 
regional rival to China.  In 1997, India fully funded a 167 kilometer road connecting the 
                                                 
82 Larry Wortzel. 2006 Annual Report to Congress Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission (Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, November 2006), 78. http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/06_annual_report.php 
(accessed 30 November 2006). 
83 Larry Niksch. Burma-U.S. Relations (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 22 
January 2007), 7. 
84 Ibid. 
 26
city of Moreh in India to Kalemyo in Burma with prospects of linking the road all the 
way to Mandalay.85  This road was completed on February 2001 and promised to foster 
further economic exchange.  Trade between Burma and India blossomed from 
approximately US$87 million 1990 to $569 million in 2005 making India the fifth largest 
trading partner after Thailand, China, Singapore, and the European Union.86  India even 
provided a soft loan of US$56.35 million to upgrade the Yangon-Mandalay rail 
connection.87   
In 2005, the Burmese head of state, Senior General Than Shwe’s visit to India 
was followed by a trip by Burma’s Army Chief General Shwe Mann in December of 
2006.88  In early January of 2007, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee paid a 
reciprocal visit to Naypyitaw, the new capital of Burma that is still under construction.89  
Many such high level state official visits have been realized with the benefit of making 
India an influential voice in Burma.  Increasingly cordial relations with India have also 
helped improve Burma’s public image and the regime’s legitimacy in the international 
community. 
2. Military Diversification 
Burma continues to have close military ties to China but has also expanded 
relations with other countries.  This comes at a time when neighbors have begun courting 
Burma to reduce China’s growing influence.  Rangoon skillfully used this to its 
advantage by creating an atmosphere of competition to acquire larger concessions from 
the respective countries during negotiations.  
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Various bilateral agreements have garnered additional hardware to continue its 
military upgrade and diversification of its weapon suppliers.  India’s rapprochement in 
the form of “constructive engagement” allowed Burma to obtain sophisticated weapons, 
such as tanks, helicopters, and radars.  In return, Burma agreed to help India with the 
insurgency problems in their border areas.   
In January 2006, Burma deployed an indigenously built missile corvette to 
participate in the Milan naval exercise, a multilateral, biannual exercise hosted by India.90   
It was the first time in decades that Burma has deployed any of its naval vessels beyond 
its territorial waters.  This shows that Burma is getting closer to India militarily and that 
its naval force is beginning to mature. 
Ukraine, Israel and even South Korea have been known to supply arms to the 
military junta.  South Korea furnished military equipment and helped construct an 
artillery munitions factory worth US$133.8 million within Burma.91  In 2001, Russia sold 
air defense systems and 10 MiG-29 state-of-the-art fighter aircraft that surpassed the 
Chinese aircraft sales in terms of technological sophistication.92  Although 
technologically superior, the number of weapon systems sold to Burma does not come 
close to the volume contributed by China. 
3. Prospect for PLAN Access to Burma 
Burma’s close relationship with the People’s Republic of China allowed the 
military junta to intensify its hold on power as well as circumvent Western sanctions.  
The military junta has since become wary of China’s considerable influence in Burma.  
To attenuate China’s growing influence, Burma became adept at creating ties with other 
nations and played them off each other for extra concessions.  Even with these new ties, 
the PRC remains Burma’s principal friend and benefactor in the region.  Burma is 
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unlikely to give up the economic and political benefits derived from this friendship, even 
at the cost of allowing PLAN vessels to make port calls.   
Today, China represents Burma’s fourth largest trading partner. China is also the 
number one exporter of military arms to Burma.  More than US$2 billion worth of arms 
have been transferred to Burma in less than two decades.  The Burmese military junta 
remains in power because of the stability provided by the military with modern arms 
procured predominantly from China.  Although sources of arms have been diversified, 
China remains the most important source that cannot easily be replaced in the foreseeable 
future.  
Chinese funds and technical expertise have allowed Burma to greatly improve the 
infrastructure of its naval bases, such as Sittwe, Mergui, St Luke’s Island, and the Coco 
Island, that are strategically located along Burma’s coastline.  All the modernizations of 
Burma’s naval installations will benefit the Chinese Navy if permission is given for the 
PLAN to make port calls in Burma.  The precedent has already been set for allowing port 
calls by PLAN vessels.  In May 2001, a Chinese submarine was allowed to make a port 
visit to Sittwe in northwestern Burma.93  Access to Burmese ports by PLAN vessels will 
be seen as simply another price to pay to gain even more benefits from China to further 
the military junta’s grip on Burma.  Given the tremendous reliance on China for military, 
economic and political assistance, Burma is likely to give deferential treatment to China 
to avoid losing Beijing’s favor and the associated benefits.   
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III. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY MODERNIZATION  
In the past twenty years, People’s Liberation Army Navy not only expanded but 
also modernized to rival some of the more powerful navies in the region and even around 
the world.  Five new classes of submarines, eight new classes of surface combatants and 
three new types of amphibious landing crafts with numerous additional supply ships 
constitute one of the most aggressive naval modernizations in the world.  The expansion 
of China’s shipbuilding industry (SBI) also contributes to PLAN’s endeavor to design 
and construct better naval vessels.  No longer is the PLA Navy relegated to coastal 
defense but was given the mandate to gain the ability to project force away from its 
littoral.  This chapter will examine the modernization effort of PLAN and how it will 
contribute to the security of China’s sea lines of communication. 
A. THE NECESSITY TO MODERNIZE THE PLA NAVY 
The reliance on imported oil imbued the PLAN with a mission that dictated the 
necessity for increased power projection capabilities.94  In the 1990s, China began 
aggressive modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy to enhance capabilities 
beyond that of coastal defense.  Although PLAN is the smallest of China’s armed 
services comprising not more than 13 percent of the over two million military personnel, 
it garners one third of the PLA budget.95  Today, the PLAN is evolving towards a navy 
that can project power across the ocean.  The added capacity of the naval facilities in 
Burma will allow the PLAN to traverse the vast distances required to guarantee the safe 
passage of China’s imported oil along the sea lines of communication.    
In the early 1990s, the PLAN was no more than a collection of mostly small naval 
vessels that could just protect its own littoral.  The majority of China’s armed forces were 
focused landward along its numerous borders and there was no impetus to divert precious 
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resources toward the smaller naval service with little apparent benefits.  Only when 
China’s economy had taken off did the military look at its navy as having a strong 
justification for force modernization.  The fantastic economic growth of the past few 
decades was, and still is, concentrated along the coastal areas at the same time China 
increasingly relies on overseas trade and offshore energy imports.96  The PLA Navy is 
responsible for ensuring the unhindered maritime trade and delivery of the vital energy 
during times of conflict or other contingencies.  When necessary, the PLA Navy will be 
dispatched away from its littorals to “meet the enemy away from its border to protect its 
economic and political centers.”97  
The relative backwardness of the PLA Navy was brought to light when the 
Chinese military establishment carried out a study of the U.S. capabilities after the first 
Gulf War.  The spectrum of technological sophistication employed by the U.S. armed 
forces prompted Beijing to seek outside technology as a temporary solution until China 
could produce its own comparable high-tech weapons, such as the Sovremenny-class 
destroyers and the Kilo-class submarines.  The requirement for a more technologically 
sophisticated navy was reinforced when the PLAN could hardly challenge the 
deployment of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups off the Taiwan straits during the 
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.98    
B. THE ROLE OF PLAN IN CHINA’S ENERGY SECURITY  
China no longer subscribes to the notion of self-sufficient domestic production of 
energy and diversified its external sources to ensure sufficient flow of energy to fuel its 
growing economy.  China depends heavily upon the sea lines of communication to 
support the seaborne trade and energy imports, increasing the significance of SLOC 
security.  The United States currently provides security for the world’s sea lines of 
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communication and China does not openly challenge the U.S. control lest it leads to 
degradation of its economy.  With the U.S. providing the costly security of the SLOCs, 
the PLAN is using the time to modernize in order to deal with future contingencies to 
include the possibility of another power disrupting the flow of energy imports.    
In addition to defending the sovereignty of China, to include the Taiwan dilemma, 
the PLAN’s primary role is to protect the vital energy imports that feed the insatiable 
appetite of the Chinese economy.  Today, there is no urgent requirement to provide 
dedicated security for the tankers transporting the imported oil, thanks to the relatively 
stable international environment.  The PLA Navy is being used as a tool of diplomacy by 
making strategic port visits to demonstrate China’s rising power status around the world, 
especially in support of gaining access to energy supplies.   
At the same time, Beijing is optimizing the PLA Navy’s ability to control or 
forcibly retake the key chokepoints along China’s extended sea lines of communication.  
This will act as a deterrent for any power that may have designs of obstructing the flow 
of energy to China.  Although Beijing is careful to not antagonize the United States and 
its allies, China is preparing for the time when the U.S. security guarantee of the SLOCs 
may be withdrawn.  Until the time PLAN gains the capability to escort the tankers across 
the ocean on its own, naval facilities in Burma represent the next best option to project 
power into the Indian Ocean to ensure the continued flow of energy imports.   
C. SUBMARINES 
The submarine is a lethal warship designed to operate underwater without 
detection that allows a relatively cheap weapon system to coerce a large body of water.  
Due to its apparent military value, the submarine comprises a formidable force that is 
leading the modernization plan of the PLA Navy.  PLA Navy is continuing with the 
ambitious, simultaneous development of five different classes of submarines.  They are 
armed with a myriad of advance torpedoes, assorted cruise missiles and even ballistic 
missiles that could be equipped with nuclear warheads.   
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Four classes of the submarines are produced indigenously while eight Kilo-class 
conventional attack submarines are being purchased from Russia.99  Of the four 
domestically produced submarines, two of them are nuclear-powered designs, the Jin 
class ballistic missile submarine and the Shang class attack submarines.  The Yuan and 
the Song classes of submarines, both conventional Kilo class equivalent, round out the 
new set of submarines being produced or acquired by the PLAN.  
The current strength of approximately 70 submarines will be upgraded with up to 
the third-plus-generation submarines and by the end of the decade, PLAN forces may 
consist of 40 additional new submarines that will replace the aging fleet.100  Although 
much of the submarine technology is old by U.S. standards, the capabilities of China’s 
submarine fleet is still formidable and remain potent as part of the navy’s force projection 
capabilities.  
D. SURFACE COMBATANTS 
Concurrent with the modernization of the submarine forces, the capabilities of the 
PLAN surface combat ships are also being vastly upgraded.  Since the beginning of the 
1990s, China purchased four Sovremenny -class destroyers from Russia in addition to 
indigenously building and deploying eight new classes of destroyers and frigates.101  The 
last of the four Russian built Sovremenny-class destroyers, designed specifically to 
counter the U.S. carrier battle groups and the Aegis destroyers was delivered to China on 
28 September 2006.102  The Sovremenny -class destroyers bring to the PLAN a longer 
cruising range as well as more lethal weapon systems that will act as a stopgap until more  
capable indigenous designs become available.  Smaller crafts with high technology 
advance hull design are also emerging in China’s fast attack craft inventory that will 
enable China to better protect its littoral. 
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1. Aircraft Carriers 
An aircraft carrier represents the epitome of power projection capability.  With a 
complement of combat aircraft and helicopters, the aircraft carrier can project air power 
almost anywhere in the world without the dependence on bases ashore.  On March 2006, 
Lt. General Wang Zhiyuan, one of the leaders in the Science and Technology Committee 
of the General Armaments Department, was quoted in the Hong Kong newspaper Wen 
Wei Po as saying “The Chinese army will conduct research and build an aircraft carrier 
and develop our own aircraft carrier fleet.”103  Although there are strong desires to 
operate an aircraft carrier, the reality is that Beijing does not have the means or the 
technical expertise to develop an indigenous aircraft carrier in the near future.    
There have been some attempts by Beijing at gaining the requisite knowledge to 
build and operate its own aircraft carrier.  In the 1980s through 1990s, Beijing bought 
three used aircraft carriers, the Melbourne from Australia, the Minsk and the Kiev from 
Russia.104  Although Chinese technicians have studied these ships, all three have been 
relegated to obscurity by being turned into floating military theme parks attracting 
tourists.105  In 2002, Beijing bought the partially complete carrier Varyag from the 
Ukraine and had it repainted by the end of 2005 with no other apparent major works done 
to make it sea worthy.106  Even if the Varyag was operational, the PLAN does not have 
the necessary command and control architecture or adequate escorts to provide security 
for the unwieldy carrier.    
2. Sovremenny-Class Destroyers 
The Sovremenny-class destroyer is the PLA Navy’s most advanced surface 
combatant.  It is a Soviet built multi-role missile destroyer that exceeds the comparable 
indigenous Chinese designs, yet is still about one generation behind the capabilities of the 
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U.S. Navy destroyers.  The Sovremenny-class destroyers allow for extended high-speed 
deployments, approximately 30 knots, with high endurance that is two to three times the 
capabilities of the Chinese built destroyers.107   
The sovremenny is armed with eight SS-N-22 Sunburns, a ram-jet propelled, 
supersonic, sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile that has a range of 120km and poses a 
tremendous threat to the U.S. carrier battle group.108  In addition, it is also armed with 
torpedoes, 130mm guns, and the highly effective SAN-17 “Grizzly” semi-active radar-
guidance intermediate-range air defense missiles that will be able to provide protection 
against air attacks for the Chinese fleet.109  The lack of adequate air defense for the 
Chinese fleet had been a grave weakness of PLAN but the addition of the Sovremenny-
class destroyers and the improving capabilities of the other warships should strengthen 
the Chinese fleets’ ability to defend themselves against air attacks.  With four 
Sovremenny-class destroyers in its inventory, the PLAN gains a significant boost in its 
ability to project naval power and, when necessary, to launch strikes against the feared 
U.S. aircraft battle groups.    
3. Indigenously-Built Surface Naval Combatants 
The bulk of the PLAN’s major surface combatants consist of a variety of 
destroyers and frigates that are either aging or already obsolete.  The PLAN is well on its 
way to replacing this aging fleet with a new generation of warships that incorporate much 
more capable air defense, antisubmarine, anti-ship, and improved replenishment-at-sea  
capabilities.  These surface naval combatants are designed to conduct coordinated attacks 
in conjunction with the formidable submarine fleet to penetrate the defenses of even the 
strongest carrier battle group.    
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In the PLAN’s drive for modernization, the emphasis has been on improving the 
surface combatant’s long-range anti-ship strike, anti-submarine, and air-defense 
capabilities.  The PLAN will satisfy this requirement by the induction of indigenously 
built five new classes of destroyers and three new classes of frigates in addition to the 
procurement of the Sovremenny-class destroyers.  Of these, the Luyang I, Luzhou (both 
destroyers), and the Jiangkai (frigate) classes employ stealth shaping to minimize radar 
acquisition by the PLAN’s future adversaries.110   
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), there are 
currently 28 destroyers and 48 frigates in the PLA Navy on active service.111  
Approximately a third of these surface combatants constitute the most advance platforms 
stemming from the modernization efforts.112  The older destroyers and frigates are 
expected to be replaced by the more capable new platforms as they become available.  In 
the meantime, the older warships are being upgraded with new guns, electronics, and 
improved anti-ship missiles to extend the usefulness of the bulk of the surface 
combatants.  The older ships are also retrofitted with the required equipment to transfer 
fuel and supplies while underway, enabling them to make longer voyages to add to the 
power projection capabilities of the PLA Navy.   
China is also strengthening its mine countermeasure capabilities, the weakest link 
in PLAN, by building a new platform called the Wozang.  The first Wozang-class ship 
was commissioned in 2005 and ten to fifteen additional platforms will be delivered to 
allow augmentation of the aging anti-mine ships.113  The PLAN currently maintains a  
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fleet of 64 mine countermeasure ships.114  The addition of the more advance mine 
countermeasure ships will shore up the PLA Navy’s vulnerabilities against any potential 
advisory’s mine warfare capabilities.   
4. Fast Attack Craft and Coastal Defense 
The fast attack crafts are relatively small offensive ships designed to employ anti-
ship weapons, such as torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles.  They make up the bulwark 
of the PLA Navy to defend the long coastline against any external or internal threats.  
Since they are not large, the fast attack crafts are typically confined to defense of the 
mainland within the littoral area of China.   
The modernization effort is led by the building of a new class of high-speed fast 
attack craft based upon the catamaran hull that incorporates stealth technology, exceeds 
30 knots and armed with eight sea skimmer missiles along with defensive guns.115  The 
wave-piercing catamaran fast attack craft was designated as the Houbei class and full 
production is underway in at least six production facilities to build the first consignment 
of approximately 40 crafts.116  These Houbei class vessels will significantly upgrade the 
capabilities of the aging fleet of China’s fast attack craft inventory.  According to the 
IISS, there are 242 patrol and coastal combatants in the PLA Navy’s inventory.117  While 
waiting for the new Houbei vessels to augment the aging fast attack fleet, the armaments, 
propulsions, and electronics will be upgraded to extend the useful life of the coastal 
defense fleet.    
E. AMPHIBIOUS FLEET 
Inherent to power projection is the capability to conduct amphibious operations to 
put combat power ashore.  The PLAN is increasing the ability to transport troops and 
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heavy equipment by boosting the capacity of the fleet of amphibious ships and landing 
crafts.  Three new classes of amphibious platforms were introduced in 2003 and PLAN 
has added 19 new amphibious ships and 10 new amphibious landing crafts to its 
inventory.118  This brings the total of PLAN’s amphibious capabilities to 73 large landing 
ships and 160 smaller landing crafts that, in a perfect world, could transport 620 tanks 
and 15,000 troops in a short amount of time.119  The probability of actually embarking 
such a high number of troops and equipment is highly dubious since most may not even 
be seaworthy due to their old age, circa 1960s and 1970s, and probable lack of 
maintenance and consistent employment.  Given time, the PLAN will be able to upgrade 
its amphibious fleet to allow it to conduct amphibious operations on a large scale. 
F. UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT FLEET 
In addition to modernizing the combat naval vessels, China is steadily improving 
its ability to refuel and re-supply its long-range maritime operations.  The capability to 
replenish while underway at sea increases the endurance and power projection of the 
naval combatants.  Most PLAN combat vessels now carry the requisite equipment to 
transfer fuel and supplies underway.  The limitation is in the lack of adequate number of 
underway replenishment vessels to consistently service the expanding PLAN warships. 
The PLA Navy operates a wide variety of logistics and support ships ranging 
from repair to research but only maintained three underway replenishment vessels.120  
Until recently, only one of these ships was a true multi-product replenishment ship able 
to dispense fuel, supplies, and munitions to warships on the move while the other two 
were simply tankers that dispensed fuel.  In 2005, the PLA Navy gained two additional 
ships that could sustain a task group of various sizes named the Qiandaohu and 
Weishanhu.121  The addition of these ships nearly triples the capability to simultaneously 
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refuel and re-supply the surface combatants but is still far from being able to allow a 
sizable fleet to operate far from homeport.  Until the PLAN can either build or acquire 
many more of these underway replenishment ships, the surface combatants will have to 
either not deploy as far or depend on host ports such as the ones found in Burma.        
G. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
The advent of the new classes of warships provides evidence of China’s 
shipbuilding industry’s expansion and modernization.  Imported technologies, improved 
management skills and modern design techniques have improved the level of capabilities 
and capacities of China’s thriving shipyards.122  Better efficiencies, skills and 
sophistications in designs enabled more seaworthy and reliable naval vessels.  While the 
Chinese shipbuilding industry is not producing systems that can rival the finest vessels of 
the United States, they do match the capabilities of the bulk of the aging U.S. Navy 
fleet.123   
The Chinese shipbuilding industry is expanding its capabilities and capacities of 
existing shipyards as well as building new and modern yards.   By 2010, China intends to 
open its new, colossal shipyards in Changxing and Chongming Islands that will 
consolidate many of China’s oldest and largest shipyards around Shanghai to enhance its 
economy of scale.124  These massive shipyards will be able to assemble the very large 
crude carrier (VLCC) vessels that weigh in at over 300,000 dead weight tons and 
represent the largest of the commercial seagoing ships.  
This means, PLAN may yet gain the capabilities to build capital ships, such as the 
cruisers and aircraft carriers.  Currently, China has eight shipyards that can build the 
VLCC vessels and another four may be operational in less than two years.  In 
comparison, South Korea and Japan, the top two shipbuilders, have 17 and 12 VLCC 
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facilities, respectively. 125  Plentiful labor resources and enhanced competitiveness has 
brought tremendous success in China’s SBI expansion and modernization.  China has an 
ambition to become the leading shipbuilding industry by 2015.126 
Many of the Chinese shipyards have technical-cooperation agreements with 
leading foreign shipbuilding firms that allowed China to acquire high-efficiency 
processing facilities, advanced production technologies, and other technologies through 
purchasing, licensing, and consignment.127  An example of the successful integration of 
these advance technologies into improvement of naval design and production is the 
evolution of the Luyang classes of destroyers.  The Luyang I 052B and Luyang II 052C-
classes of destroyers are being built at Jiangnan using modular construction techniques 
and computer-aided design and manufacturing systems.128  The hulls are larger than the 
previous Luhai class and allow larger weapons capacity, provide a more stable platform 
and versatility for future upgrades.  The first Luyang II destroyer was built in 10 months 
and commissioned in less than 25 months, a speedy process by today’s standards.129  
Overall, it only took four years to complete two 052B-class and one 052C-class 
destroyers with the second one near completion, compared to an entire decade to build 
one Luhu and one Luhai destroyers in the 1990s. 
In addition to building the ships, the PRC is also developing and modernizing its 
shore facilities to service and repair the commercial and naval fleets.  The PRC 
anticipates operating 2,000 ports with an annual servicing capacity of over one billion 
tons vice 600 million tons with 1,300 ports from a decade ago.130  The commercial fleet 
also has another, often overlooked, significant contribution to the PLAN.  Approximately 
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72 percent of the commercial fleet is registered under the Chinese flag and in time of war, 
the commercial industry could reinforce PLAN with ships and sailors.131   
Although the future looks bright, there are weaknesses in the shipbuilding 
industry that could hamper PLAN’s modernization efforts.  Chinese SBI has had to 
confront frequent difficulties in producing quality and technological sophisticated 
subsystems for its commercial as well as the naval vessels.  Key components, such as the 
propulsion systems, navigational equipment, electronic sensor suites and major weapon 
systems had to be imported from foreign vendors to outfit the newest naval platforms.132  
All the new destroyers depend on the advanced combat control systems that are data 
linked via the Russian Mineral-ME system.  The Luhai destroyer, launched in 1997, 
incorporated Ukrainian GT25000 GAS-turbines as well as the German MTU 12V 
1163TB83 diesels.133  Many times, systems-integration challenges cropped up during 
installations of these imported components and hampered production schedules.  Heavy 
reliance on foreign components also produces security concerns for PLAN.  
Understandably, PLAN would like to control these key supplies if ever there was a 
conflict. 
In the last two decades, China’s shipbuilding industry blossomed to become the 
third largest in the world with promises of even greater growth and prosperity.  The 
incorporation of advance manufacturing and management techniques, along with 
importation of advance technology in the shipbuilding industry, are helping in 
constructing state of the art warships.  The view of the Chinese navy as only a coastal 
force has long faded and the People’s Liberation Army Navy is gaining prominence as a 
tool of the state.  The PLAN can now deploy its combatants to far reaches in the region 
and will be able to ply the Indian Ocean with the help of naval facilities in Burma. 
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IV. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Asia-Pacific region is characterized by growing economic power and relative 
political stability with governments ranging from democracies to authoritarian regimes.  
The region contains eight of the ten largest economies, two of the most populous nations 
and eight of the world’s ten largest military forces.134   Even with these vast capabilities 
and opposing principles of governance, there has not been a major armed conflict in the 
region in the last quarter of a century.  This is due in part to the interdependence of the 
various nations of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the security umbrella provided by the 
United States that enables many countries in the region to prosper. 
This chapter will address the potential effects of, and regional reactions to, the 
significant increase in PLAN’s capabilities that would result from access to naval 
facilities in Burma.  The Asia-Pacific region continues to rely on the United States to 
provide security and freedom of navigation for the sea lines of communication that are 
essential for regional and international trade.  With the exception of India and Russia, 
most countries in the Asia-Pacific region are unable to project naval power beyond their 
littorals.  If the PLAN gains access to naval facilities in Burma and begins patrols along 
its sea lines of communications, this will give rise to new security dilemmas throughout 
the region. 
The following three scenarios, promoting regional cooperation, more resources to 
combat piracy, and sharing the burden of the Asia-Pacific maritime security, represent 
ideal visions of an expanded Chinese naval presence through the use of Burma’s naval 
facilities.  These visions will be followed by counterarguments that demonstrate that the 
ideal visions do not represent reality in its entirety.  The implications of China’s access to 
Burma’s naval facilities are much more complex and the reactions and the ramifications 
of the regional powers will be assessed. 
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A. PLAN EXPANDED PRESENCE GOOD FOR THE REGION 
The People’s Republic of China has been astute in its interactions with the 
regional neighbors since its climb up the economic and military development ladder in 
the early 1990s.  The PRC engaged most of the regional powers in bilateral as well as the 
multilateral organizations and forums to forestall anxieties about China’s rise in power.  
By promoting greater engagement, the People’s Republic of China is signaling to the 
region that China can contribute substantially to the overall security and economic 
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, especially with its added capability to deploy its 
naval forces well into the Indian Ocean. 
1. Promoting Regional Cooperation  
The Asia-Pacific encompasses large bodies of water along with critical sea 
transportation routes that are vital for economic development of many diverse countries.  
The United States is the uncontested naval power providing overarching security 
guarantee for the freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region.  The PRC, with its 
significant resources, could assist the United States as well as the rest of the Asia-Pacific 
naval powers in providing security and stability throughout the region by promoting 
regional cooperation. 
The PRC has been expanding its role in security cooperation by participating in 
various regional security forums to include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).  In 2003, China 
strengthened ties with ASEAN by signing the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” that 
“renounces the use of force and calls for greater economic and political cooperation.”135  
China also made strides in maritime security by participating in the writing of the 
memorandums on such topics as cooperation for regional maritime cooperation,  
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cooperation for law and order at sea and concepts of comprehensive security in the 
CSCAP forums that brought together such diverse nations as India, Japan, North Korea, 
and the United States.136  
In addition to multilateral security initiatives, China inculcated itself into the 
region through many bilateral arrangements that have raised China’s influence in the 
region.  Various high-ranking Chinese leaders either host or attend numerous summits 
and high level meetings with equivalent ranking officials from the regional countries 
throughout each year.  In September 2004, the International Department of the CCP 
hosted 350 delegates from 81 political parties from 35 Asian countries that included eight 
heads of state.137  China even improved bilateral relations with nations that it has had 
hostile relations in the past.  Examples include Vietnam, India, and South Korea.  The 
PLAN also conducts a number of bilateral exercises with many of the Asian countries 
that emphasizes maritime search and rescue operations and professional exchanges.  In 
addition, naval vessels from many of the Asia-Pacific countries have paid port visits to 
China as well as reciprocal goodwill cruises by PLAN vessels.  
2. More Resources to Combat Piracy 
The Asia-Pacific region is faced with the concentration of high incidences of 
seaborne piracy that threaten to disrupt the traditional sea lines of communication that 
flow through the Strait of Malacca.  In 2006, seaborne piracy accounted for the loss of 
millions of dollars in worldwide trade.  The relatively narrow straits in the commercial 
sea-lanes allow the pirates to prey on slow cargo ships with near impunity.  Although the 
sea lines of communication are routinely patrolled by the United States Navy, more naval 
assets and close cooperation between littoral countries in the Straits are required to 
combat this menace.    
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The worldwide reported piracy attacks decreased to 239 in 2006 compared to 276 
in 2005.138  Although the total numbers of reported attacks have gone down, most of the 
attacks remain in the Asia-Pacific region.  Indonesia alone accounted for fifty pirate 
attacks in 2006 and eleven attacks even occurred within the Strait of Malacca.139  This 
posses danger not only for merchant ships but for oil tankers transporting vital energy 
supplies to China.   
 
 
Figure 2.   IMB 2006 Piracy Map highlights the concentration of piracy in the vicinity of the 
Malacca Strait140 
 
With PLAN vessels’ cruising range extended through access to Burma’s ports, 
China would be able to contribute greatly to the security of the Malacca Strait through 
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increased military presence to deter further acts of piracy.  The three littoral countries, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have limited naval and air assets that prevent 
adequate patrol of the Strait of Malacca and the surrounding waters.  The additional 
Chinese naval vessels transiting through the Strait of Malacca could bolster the number 
of naval combatants in the fight against piracy in and around the Strait of Malacca.   
Although China is not in the immediate vicinity of the Strait of Malacca, it still 
relies on the strait as a conduit for its economic and strategic products just as much as 
Japan, South Korea and other developed and developing countries in East and Southeast 
Asia.  Regional engagement can be expanded to include PLAN vessels participating in 
joint anti-piracy maneuvers that will aid the littoral states fend off the threats from 
pirates.  The PRC can substantially increase its participation in the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), a 
regional agreement that promotes collaboration to stamp out piracy and armed robbery in 
Asia.141  Joint operations can also be coordinated between the United States Navy and the 
PLAN to profile the commitment of the respective countries against the tyranny of 
piracy.   
3. Sharing the Burden of the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security 
The United States Navy invests significant resources and manpower in the 
operation and deployment of its largest fleet, the 7th Fleet, to patrol and provide a 
stabilizing presence in the Asia-Pacific region.  With eight of the world’s ten largest 
military forces and a diverse political governance concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, 
the 7th Fleet has a daunting task of maintaining stability and security in the high seas as 
well as the narrow straits to allow free flow of trade that is vital to the world.  The PLAN 
could assist by cooperating with the U.S. Navy in patrolling the immense regional 
expanse of water at the same time demonstrate China’s willingness to promote peace and 
stability. 
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The Pacific and the Indian Oceans encompass over 54 million square miles that is 
patrolled by only 40-50 naval combatants from the U.S. 7th Fleet, of which 18 naval 
vessels are forward-deployed to Guam and Japan.142  These 18 vessels form the most 
visible part of the U.S. naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region, not to mention they 
reduce the transit time by over a week from the continental United States.  The PLAN 
already deploys regularly in the South China Sea and can help the United States by 
augmenting and expanding the naval patrols to maintain peace in the region.   
B. COUNTERARGUMENT: HAZARDS TO STABILITY 
The above campaigns for expanded engagement by China have tremendous 
appeal for the United States and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.  If China were deeply 
enmeshed in the region, it would be less likely to resort to military means to resolve 
future conflicts.  A genuinely engaged China will facilitate further economic growth and 
prosperity in the region.  Unfortunately, there are other aspects of China’s maritime 
regional engagements that make the U.S. skeptical to the intent of the CCP’s political and 
military goals.  Some of these features are China’s lack of transparency, the impact of 
PLAN’s increased power projection capabilities, and the existing maritime territorial 
disputes in the region. 
1. China’s Transparency Issues 
Over the last two decades, China has been expanding its naval capabilities at a 
rapid pace.  This reflects a change in the priorities of a military that traditionally places 
the most emphasis on the land component of its armed forces.  There is a lack of 
transparency and very little knowledge about the Chinese motivations for supporting the 
PLA Navy modernization.  This lack of transparency coupled with the significant 
increase in the cruising range of PLAN vessels through access to naval facilities in 
Burma amplifies tensions already present in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Aggressive military modernization supported by a burgeoning economy without 
reasonable rationales increases the likelihood that China’s neighbors will feel threatened.  
Although no country can be completely transparent when it comes to national security, 
the PLA is one of the least transparent militaries in the Asia-Pacific region.  In regional 
forums, Chinese officials state that military modernization is for defensive purposes but 
their navy continues to invest in strategic assets, such as submarines, ballistic and cruise 
missiles that are typically offensive in nature.   
2. Power Projection Capabilities 
The Chinese military is now able to project power well beyond its sovereign 
borders with the advent of advance submarines, new naval surface combatants, and 
ballistic and cruise missile technology upgrades.  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report stated that China has the “greatest potential to compete militarily with the United 
States that could eventually offset traditional U.S. military advantages.”143  Although 
ostensibly for self-defense purposes, these technologies can easily be used for offensive 
purposes.   
As discussed in chapter three, the Chinese naval modernization is giving 
innovative and deadly capabilities to PLAN that far exceed most defensive requirements 
in the eyes of the United States.  On 26 October 2006, a Song-class attack submarine, 
capable of launching long-range anti-ship cruise missiles while submerged, approached 
undetected and surfaced within five miles of the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in the 
vicinity of Okinawa.144  It was unclear if the incident was a mistake or a demonstration of 
capabilities against one of the flagships of the U.S. Navy.  The recent acquisitions of  
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the advanced conventional Russian Kilo-class submarines further enhance PLAN’s 
ability to quietly deploy long distances and confront the U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups 
with its wake-homing torpedoes.145  
The 2006 QDR implied that the weapon systems selected for speedy 
modernization by China were designed to target the weakest points of the U.S. Naval 
combatants.146  This includes the recent test of the ASAT that can destroy or disrupt the 
GPS and intelligence related satellites that the United States and the rest of the world 
have come to depend upon.147  The PLAN also invests in an indigenously built, ultra-
modern stealth destroyer that successfully completed a 9,000 nautical mile long sea-trial 
that lasting over 120 days.148  With no external maritime threats and near-opaque 
motivations for its massive naval arms buildup, the United States, as well as the Asia-
Pacific region, can only speculate on the true nature of the selective naval modernization 
efforts by the CCP.   
3. Maritime Territorial Disputes 
The PLAN’s lack of transparency coupled with appreciable growth of power 
projection capabilities is heightening tension in the myriads of maritime territorial 
disputes to a dangerous level.  The side effect of the end of the Cold War was the 
collapse of restraints imposed by the superpowers that discouraged regional disputes.  
Now, there are even more territorial and sovereignty disputes in the region that have the 
possibility of leading to armed conflicts.   
Leading the territorial disputes and the possibility of a widespread-armed conflict 
is the case of Taiwan.  The PRC has a claim to Taiwan and specifically threaten the use 
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of force to maintain its territorial integrity despite the enormous political and economical 
consequences.149  In fact, much of PLAN’s modernization centers on the requirement to 
conduct anti-access operations against the U.S. Navy if reunification is carried out 
militarily.  Although the chance of a large-scale military invasion of Taiwan is low, the 
increased capabilities of PLAN and its long-range weapons, such as ballistic and cruise 
missiles, is already intensifying tensions between the PRC and the Republic of China.150  
The other maritime territorial disputes range from the Senkaku Islands, half way 
between Taiwan and Okinawa, to the Spratley Island in the South China Sea.  Despite 
participation in various confidence-building initiatives with ASEAN, the PLAN upset the 
status quo in 1999 by upgrading the crude shacks into concrete structures on the Mischief 
Reef, territory claimed by and within 200 miles of Philippines.151  China placing marker 
buoys, building permanent and semi-permanent structures supported by naval re-supply 
missions have become commonplace in the ongoing maritime territorial disputes.152   
Many of the maritime disputes stem from the desire to secure the respective sea 
lines of communication and the oil and gas resources associated with these territories, 
most of which only contain uninhabitable rocks and shoal that are submerged during high 
tide.153  With the PLAN’s increase in power and capabilities, there are fears from the 
other claimants that China may turn to using force to secure its claims to the various 
maritime territorial disputes despite Beijing signing the “Declaration on the Conduct of  
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Parties in the South China Sea.”154  The respective countries may opt to increase their 
own capabilities by building up their naval forces to offset the growing strength of the 
PLAN, adding to the tension in the region.    
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA 
The Republic of India is a regional economic and military power that has the 
largest liberal democracy in the world.  It is the second most populous country in the 
world at 1.09 billion people and one of the few countries that continues to operate an 
aircraft carrier.155  India’s GDP continues to grow at an average rate of 7 percent and 
increasingly requires imported energy in the form of oil and natural gas that may rival 
that of China in the future.156  India currently has cordial relations with its regional 
neighbors and as well as with the United States of America.  If Beijing continues to press 
for access to port facilities in Burma and actually deploys its naval forces into the Indian 
Ocean to escort its tanker fleet, the Republic of India would surely feel threatened by the 
expanded capabilities of the Chinese naval forces. 
1. India’s Encirclement 
China is a major power that surpasses India in terms of sheer size, population, 
conventional, and nuclear military capabilities.  Although perceived as a major external 
military threat to India, the Chinese ability to project conventional military power was 
limited, until the mid 1990s, due to the highly militarized 3380km border and China’s 
lack of maritime power projection capabilities.  The PRC compensated by establishing 
economic and security cooperation amongst India’s neighbors, especially with Pakistan  
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and Burma.  Despite China encircling India through cooperation with its neighbors, the 
PRC and India have maintained a delicate balance of stability that enabled one another to 
grow economically and militarily.   
The rapid modernization of the PLAN, especially with access to naval facilities in 
Burma, poses significant challenges for India as well as to the stability of the region.  
With access to Burma, the PLAN would be able to penetrate further into the Indian 
Ocean, a capability that would tip the balance of power in China’s favor in the future.  
Chinese deployments to the Indian Ocean will be construed by New Delhi as a challenge 
for the Indian Navy that considers the Indian Ocean as its domain.  Despite this future 
prospect, the PLAN still falls short of challenging the dominant naval power of the Indian 
Ocean since it does not have aircraft carriers to compensate for the carrier India has been 
successfully operating for some time.  What this portends is that both regional powers 
will likely accelerate the modernization of the respective navies as well as the power 
projection capabilities of their defense establishments.      
2. Effects on India’s Foreign Policy 
In 1988, India was critical of Burma’s handling of the student uprising and openly 
supported the democracy movement.  China, on the other hand, was fully supportive of 
Burma’s hard line tactics in the suppression of the uprising and cemented its relationship 
with Burma.  In light of China’s encirclement, India reversed its stance and took a 
pragmatic approach in its dealings with Burma.  This holds true for India’s international 
relations in the Asia-Pacific region and especially with the United States.  
Simultaneously, India also intensified its military modernization to ensure it remained the 
dominant regional power in South Asia.    
India’s rapprochement with Burma began in the early 1990s and New Delhi’s 
influence has increased over the years.  Economic ties, as well as military cooperation, 
continue to bring India and Burma closer together despite Chinese resentment.  India and 
Burma cooperate on issues ranging from fighting terrorism to arms smuggling and drug 
trafficking.  India even extended lines of credit worth millions of U.S. dollars to allow 
Burma to fund infrastructure projects, such as hydroelectric plants, telecom projects and 
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building new roads.157  India can be expected to offer Burma larger economic incentives 
and military aid packages, as well as the air of legitimacy India can provide as the largest 
democracy in the world, to persuade it to not to grant China access to its ports.  
Unfortunately, China is some decades ahead of India and New Delhi is unlikely to match 
Beijing’s absolute dollar amount of aid and the potent influence over Burma, especially 
the Chinese veto power in the UN Security Council.   
India will continue to assert itself in economic trade and military cooperation with 
the ASEAN countries in hopes of dampening China’s influence in Southeast Asia.  Since 
1990, India-ASEAN trade grew from US$2.4 billion to US $23 billion in 2005 and is 
projected to exceed US $30 billion by the end of this year.158  The growing economy and 
the technological prowess of India will undoubtedly draw investments from all over 
Southeast Asia.  With greater dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN, India hopes to 
demonstrate that India is the dominant regional power in the Indian Ocean.     
Over the past two decades, Indo-U.S. rapprochement gained momentum with 
increasing economic and military ties.  The United States is conducting complex military 
exercises with Indian armed forces at the same time liberalizing arms and technology 
transfers that aid in securing India’s borders and sea lines of communication.159  Such 
close cooperation is in line with the U.S. collaboration with other key Asian allies, such 
as Japan and South Korea.   
In addition to India’s expansion of influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region, 
New Delhi is continuing the modernization of its formidable armed forces at an even 
faster pace.  Since 1998, India has increased its defense budget by 13 to 25 percent per 
year, acquiring sophisticated new equipment with enhanced power projection  
                                                 
157 “Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam’s Recent Visit to Myanmar.” Indian Defence Review 21, no. 
1 (1 January 2006 – 31 March 2006) https://www.opensource.gov (accessed 17 February 2007). 
158 Raj Chengappa. “PAFTA Anyone?; India Works Out the Modalitities for a Free Trade Agreement 
with ASEAN and Pushes for an Economic Arrangement That Could Rival the EU.” India Today  (29 
January 2007) http://proquest.umi.com  (accessed 4 June 2007), 38. 
159 Robert Sutter. China’s Rise in Asia, 244. 
 53
capabilities.160  The Indian Navy is the fifth in the world and maintains its blue water 
capabilities consisting of an aircraft carrier, over 40 surface combatants including guided 
missile cruisers, and more than a dozen submarines.161     
In attempting to penetrate deeper into the Indian Ocean and onto the Persian Gulf, 
the PLAN is cognizant of the regional powers that ply the Indian Ocean.  The Indian 
Navy is a formidable force that will likely stand its ground if provoked by China.  This is 
especially true since the Indian Air Force can range well into the Indian Ocean with its air 
refueling capabilities.  Without an aircraft carrier to bring air support, the PLAN will be 
at a drastic disadvantage so far from homeport.  It may be many years before China gains 
enough naval power to counter the Indian Navy at its home turf and New Delhi will 
likely press this advantage when dealing with Beijing.   
D. CHALLENGES FOR JAPAN 
In the Asia-Pacific region, no other nations depend upon the U.S. security 
umbrella more than Japan.  Although Japan has armed forces capable of defending its 
homeland, Japan lacks its own power projection capabilities that can safeguard its 
immense energy imports that routinely travel through the Strait of Malacca and other 
strategic chokepoints.  The increase in China’s naval capabilities may be seen as a threat 
to Japan’s security and access to Burma’s naval facilities may heighten that perception.      
1. Japan’s Military Threat Perceptions 
After World War Two, Japan was forbidden to use military force for waging war 
by the United States-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 and the United States took 
responsibility to defend Japan against external military attacks.162  American troops are 
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still stationed on bases throughout Japan that not only provide defense for the Japanese 
but for other nations friendly to the United States in the region.  The United States also 
provides security for the regional sea lines of communication that is crucial for the oil 
imports that ensure the nation’s economic prosperity.  Japan continues to rely on the 
United States for its security but China’s expansion of its power projection capabilities 
through Burma may drive Japan toward considerable conventional build-up, especially of 
its maritime forces.   
Japan is the second largest global economic power and also the second largest net 
importer of oil along with being the third leading oil consumer in the world.163  
Protection of Japan’s oil supply is one of the crucial concerns for Japan’s comprehensive 
security.  Old tensions from previous Sino-Japanese conflicts make Japan wary of 
Chinese intentions in its military modernization and assertive military posture in the 
deployment of its naval vessels in and around the Japanese sea lines of communication.  
This is reinforced by the repeated intrusions into Japanese territorial waters off the coast 
of Okinawa by various types of Chinese ships and even a Chinese nuclear powered 
submarine.164  The deployments of PLAN vessels near the contested Senkaku Islands 
have also aroused insecurity for the Japanese.   
In addition to rapid military modernization, the PRC’s close relationship with 
Burma over the years has heightened Japanese concern of mounting Chinese regional 
influence.  Operating out of Burmese naval ports will enhance Japan’s perception that the 
Chinese new power projection capability may endanger the Japanese oil imports and even 
shift the balance of regional power toward China.  This may lead to Japan hedging 
against China by building up its naval and air capabilities that will undoubtedly raise 
regional tensions as well as the concerns of Japan normalizing its defense establishment.    
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2. Effects on Japanese Foreign Policy 
Japan has kept a wary eye on China’s fantastic economic rise along with its robust 
military modernization, especially its power projection capabilities.  Since most of the 
PRC’s attention had been centered on the Taiwan scenario, Japan did not feel threatened 
with the advancement of the Chinese military.  The ability to operate in the Indian Ocean 
through access to Burmese naval facilities will allow China to influence regional security 
along the sea lines of communication and the strategic chokepoints that can threaten the 
oil imports of Japan. 
In the Asia-Pacific, Japan helps maintain the regional balance of power through 
its formidable economic power and self-defense capabilities as well as being the staunch 
ally of the United States.  Although a self-defense force, the Japanese military is one of 
the most advanced in the region and capable of joint operations outside of its littoral.  The 
U.S.-Japan alliance constrains Japan from becoming a normal power but if China’s 
intention to escort tankers with the help of port facilities in Burma is realized, the 
constraints may no longer exist.   
Japan is already assuming a more active military role in international affairs.  In 
recent years, Japan deployed some of its military troops and equipment in support of the 
United Nation peacekeeping operations around the world.  The Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force also deployed its supply ships with destroyer escorts to the Indian Ocean 
to help provide fuel to allied warships as part of the U.S.-led Global War on Terror 
campaign.165  After the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1511 in October 
2003, Japan deployed approximately 600 Ground Self Defense Force troops to southern 
Iraqi city of Samawah to conduct humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.166  This 
marked the first time Japan deployed its troops to a combat zone in over 50 years.   
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This increase in the deployment of Japanese Self Defense Forces could signal a 
more willing attitude toward normalizing Japan’s Self Defense Forces.  Thus far, the 
move toward normalization has been kept in check due to Japan’s security alliance with 
the United States.  The deployment of PLAN vessels into the Indian Ocean may elicit 
fear of Chinese regional dominance and prompt Japan to embark on a major arms build-
up or even the normalization of its defense forces.     
In order to forestall a new security dilemma in the region, Japan engaged Burma 
in order to counter the extensive Chinese influence.  Japan seeks to promote 
democratization and improve human rights by engaging Burma instead of isolating it, as 
the United States is doing through tough sanctions.  From 1998 to 2003, Japan’s direct 
investment in Burma amounted to US$212.57 million while loans and credits were up to 
$2.5 billion by 2006.167  Although its influence is increasing, Japan is far from catching 
up to the sway China has over Burma.   
E. SOUTH KOREA 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a unique country that maintains an active 
defense of its border against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the 
north while preserving its relationships with the United States, Japan, and China.  The 
United States represents the most important ally that p0072ovides security and troops 
against hostilities by the DPRK.  Japan is a neighbor to the east with a high degree of 
economic interaction as well as the shared problem of the North Korea’s nuclear tests.  
China, on the other hand, represents tremendous economic opportunities as well as a 
potential threat to South Korea’s thriving economy that depends heavily on imported oil.  
The threat posed by PLAN’s enhancement of its power projection capabilities through 
access to naval facilities in Burma may compel South Korea to further expand its already 
robust military forces that may add to the destabilization of the region.   
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1. South Korea’s Threat Perception 
South Korea is located on the southern end of the Korean Peninsula that 
overlooks the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea.  With DPRK to its north, South Korea 
depends upon the sea lines of communication to conduct its trade as well as import the 
vital oil to fuel its economy.  With the United States drawing down its forces in South 
Korea and the military rise of China nearby, Seoul seeks to embrace a more independent 
capacity to respond to external threats.   
After the Korean War, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed the 
ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty that enabled the U.S. to station troops in South Korea 
to deter and if necessary, destroy the North Korean forces.  Until the 1990s, the U.S. 
troops stationed in South Korea remained around 50,000.168  In 2004, the United States 
and ROK agreed to a three-phase reduction of 12,500 troops that will be complete by 
2008.169  While the drawdown continues, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon in 
an underground facility on 16 October 2006 that added additional tension to the South 
Korean leadership.170 
As South Korea continues to deal with the DPRK to its north, Seoul has been 
keeping a wary eye on the astonishing economic growth and military modernization of 
China to its west.  Although Seoul remains cautious, China surpassed the United States as 
the largest trading partner of South Korea in 2003.171  Trade between the two countries 
continues to grow despite uneasiness of South Korea toward the anticipated access to 
naval facilities in Burma to boost China’s power projection capabilities.  Even if the 
South Korea’s energy imports are not threatened, Seoul still has to strike a balance 
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between continued economic ties with China and maintaining strong alliance with the 
United States to ward off future conflicts, be it the DPRK or another power.    
2. Effects on South Korea’s Foreign Policy 
South Korea continues to view North Korea as its primary foreign policy 
challenge yet despite the constant threat and drain on the resources for defense, South 
Korea continues to grow economically and garner more influence in the region.  As 
South Korea becomes more interconnected with the regional powers, Seoul is also aware 
of China’s probable access to naval facilities in Burma and the accompanying increased 
power projection capabilities.  This comes at a time when the United States is drawing 
down its forces in South Korea.  In response to these developments, Seoul can be 
expected to insist upon more authority over its own military and political affairs at the 
same time expand and further modernize its military.   
In April 2007, North Korea and Burma restored diplomatic relations after more 
than 20 years of isolation.172  The renewed relationship could benefit Burma by gaining 
access to more sophisticated military technologies, to include North Korea’s nuclear 
technology, while North Korea could profit from access to Burma’s abundant natural 
resources.173  Although it is unlikely North Korea will be able to increase Burma’s 
military capacity significantly, the new relationship will add to the already complex web 
of associations in the Korean Peninsula.   
The drawdown of the U.S. forces along with the rising military capabilities of 
China prompted the South Korean leadership to undertake a modernization drive to 
replace antiquated equipment to strengthen its defense capabilities beyond the border 
scenario with North Korea.  With the help of the United States, South Korea is replacing 
many of its aging fighter aircraft, naval surface combatants, tanks and artillery pieces 
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with superior weapon systems that are compatible with U.S. systems.174  The ROK forces 
are also gaining valuable experience in a combat zone with over 3,000 troops working 
closely with U.S. forces in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.175   
South Korea long considers its alliance with the United States as the “backbone” 
of its security relationship.176  Although this is still valid, Seoul already embarked on a 
concept of self-defense raising the military capacity proportional with the reduction of the 
U.S. forces.  This was initiated by the South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun during the 
celebration of the 58th national independence on 15 August 2003 and emphasized the 
self-reliant military system.177   
On 3 June 2006, the South Korean Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense announced that the wartime operational control would be ceded to South Korea 
as soon as the ROK forces secure the capability for warfare.178  This means the ROK 
forces will be commanded by South Koreans at the same time South Korean forces 
become the primary fighters while the Americans take a supporting role.  Command and 
control, as well as the ability to gather intelligence, will also be upgraded to enable this 
transition.  The trend to gain independent control of South Korean armed forces, as well 
as continued modernization of its armed forces, can be expected to accelerate if China 
continues to press for access to Burma to magnify its power projection capabilities.   
F. IMPACT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Southeast Asia is a collection of developing nations that occupy the land in and 
around the crucial sea lines of communication of the Asia-Pacific region.  These nations 
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are marked by political varieties, economic disparities, and various ethnic tensions.  The 
one thing they do agree on is that China is rising economically and militarily in the region 
and that many of the Southeast Asian nations have generally close ties to China.  Burma, 
on the other hand, has been a source of embarrassment to the Southeast Asian nations 
though Rangoon’s policies of anti-democratic repressions and blatant disregard for 
human-rights that have drawn the ire of the international community.  With China 
supporting Burma, the call by ASEAN for Burma to expedite democratization and 
stopping human rights abuses have been largely ignored.179  With no appreciable naval 
power, individually or collectively, the Southeast Asian Nations may also be 
marginalized by China’s access to naval facilities in Burma.  
1. China’s Rise in the Region 
Southeast Asia represents a collection of nations China has come to befriend to 
promote its economic interests as well as a place to cultivate natural resources to help 
fuel the growing Chinese economy.  Southeast Asia also represents a strategic crossroad 
that is crucial for the transportation of its imported energy and China has gone out of its 
way to allay fears and build credibility in the region.   
In October 2003, China signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that emphasized nonaggression and 
opened the way for increased economic cooperation in the region.180  Trade between 
China and Southeast Asian nations reached US$130.37 billion in 2005 and will likely 
continue to soar.181  The China-ASEAN FTA, expected to be approved within the next 
five years, will represent the world’s largest market comprising more than 1.7 billion 
consumers and shared trade of over US$1.2 trillion.182  Bilateral ties also flourished 
                                                 
179 Jurgen Haacke. “Myanmar’s Foreign Policy.” 60. 
180 “China Joins Treaty of Amity, Cooperation in Southeast Asia.” People’s Daily (9 October 2003) 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/09/eng20031009_125570.shtml (accessed 10 April 2007). 
181 “Full Text of Joint Statement of China-ASEAN Commemorative Summit.” People’s Daily Online 
(31 October 2006) http://english.people.com.cn/200610/31/eng20061031_316726.html (accessed 10 April 
2007). 
182 Michael Connors, Remy Davison and Jorn Dosch. The New Global Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 
60.  
 61
between China and Southeast Asian nations in the last decade.  China and Thailand 
established a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in 2003 that reached US$17.3 billion in 
2004 along with purchases of military equipment from China to include warships.183  In 
July 2005, Indonesia signed a deal to gain Chinese assistance in developing its medium 
range missiles along with other economic and defense related arrangements.184  
Beijing also uses high-level state official visits to show its commitment to 
Southeast Asia, ensure continued good relations, and cement the rising economic 
cooperation in the region.  No longer is Beijing overtly confrontational with its Southeast 
Asian neighbors, instead uses adroit diplomacy backed by tangible incentives such as 
sizable preferential loans and military aid packages.  Through leveraging bilateral and 
multilateral interactions with the Southeast Asian nations, China has been able to gain a 
level of mutual reliance to allay their fears about the Chinese rise in the region.   
2. Southeast Asia Reactions 
The rapid economic and military rise of China is producing anxiety amongst the 
Southeast Asian nations that have very few naval capabilities and lack the political clout 
needed to resist the expansion of PLAN into their backyards.  The PRC participates in 
most of the regional security forums but has not been transparent in its intentions toward 
the region.  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations have been working with China 
and gained considerable economic benefits in the process but still harbor suspicions that 
China may be trying to gain much more than economic cooperation in the region.  In 
addition to conferring with China, ASEAN also engaged Burma, through its principle of 
non-interference, to offset China’s tremendous influence despite ASEAN’s uneasiness of 
Burma’s military regime, human rights abuses, and its pariah status.   
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Chinese officials consistently state that the military modernization is for peaceful 
development and defensive purposes.  In order to be more transparent, Beijing publishes 
its bi-annual Defense White Paper that reiterates the pursuit of a national defense policy 
that is purely defensive in nature.185  What the ASEAN members see is China’s growing 
influence around the Asia-Pacific region with corresponding rise in its power projection 
capabilities that goes beyond self-defense, such as the ballistic missiles and the 
modernizing navy.  The willingness to employ these capabilities have been felt by felt by 
Southeast Asian nations in China’s forceful claims on the maritime territorial disputes 
that were discussed earlier in this chapter.       
The Southeast Asian governments responded to China’s increasing influence by 
working closer “with one another and other non-Asian powers, notably the United 
States.”186  Although China’s influence is growing in the region, the United States still 
retains a tremendous presence as well as present economic opportunities for ASEAN.  
Southeast Asian governments can be expected to hedge against China by sustaining 
relations with the United States to diminish Beijing’s influence that may not be in the 
best interests of the affected Southeast Asian nations.  This trend will only accelerate if 
China gains access to naval facilities in Burma to deploy its navy for escort duties 
through the already congested waterways in the Southeast Asian region.   
ASEAN has also been working to coax Burma away from the overwhelming 
influence of China and in 1997 Burma was inducted into the association.  In addition to 
pressures on Burma to improve its human rights record and work toward democratic 
governance, ASEAN has also drawn support from India to help offset the balance of 
influence over Rangoon.  Since New Delhi would not want to see further infiltration of 
Burma by China, India works hard to support ASEAN in supporting democratic reforms, 
as well as providing economic aid.187    
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Burma has since integrated itself into the region and is working toward further 
diversification that will bring prosperity to the country without over reliance on any 
single country.  Unfortunately, this may not be possible with the strong sanctions 
imposed by the West.  Even integrated into the region, the lure of unconditional 
diplomatic, military, and economic aids is too great for a country that is in a pariah status 
with no hope of expanding its markets without help from the west, namely the United 
States. 
G. THE UNITED STATES 
The United States is the current self-professed guarantor of freedom of navigation 
in the world’s sea lines of communication.  No other nation has the capability or the 
willingness to take on this responsibility.  China currently views the United States as a 
regional stabilizer but if access is granted to naval facilities in Burma, there could be 
conflict of interests between the two nations.188  Regional stability is paramount to 
continued prosperity and the United States can ill afford to have a naval arms race that 
could stymie its economic, political and military prerogatives. 
1. U.S. Regional Interests 
The United States has significant interests in the Asia region as well as the Indian 
Ocean.  The Asian economies reflect the total U.S. trade volume twice of the European 
Union and are vital to the wealth and prosperity of the United States.  Some of the other 
interests include freedom of navigation to promote free trade, sustain America’s treaty 
allies and friends, and advance the rule of law and the democratic form of governance.189   
Asia represents the single largest concentration of international economic powers 
in the world.  Eight of the world’s ten fastest growing economies are found in the Asia 
region.  The Asia region encompasses 28.56 percent of the global GDP of US$46.66 
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trillion in 2006.190  This is in comparison to 24.48 and 30.58 percent of the global GDP 
for the European Union and the United States respectively.191  Asia grew at an average of 
7.2 percent with China at 9.5 percent and North Korea at 1.0 percent that encompassed 
the highest and lowest growth rates in the region.192  The high economic growth, as well 
as the percent of the world’s GDP is likely to remain at relatively high levels for the 
foreseeable future.  As the world’s premier power, the Asia-Pacific represents a region 
for the United States to continue its growth and ensure its vitality well into the future.   
2. U.S. Policy Towards Burma 
In 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide democratic 
election in Burma.  Despite the military party winning only ten seats in the Parliament, as 
opposed to 392 out of 485 seats for the NLD, the military junta refused to honor the 
election results.193  Many of the elected parliamentarians were arrested or driven out of 
political life by the military.  With increasing human rights abuses and continued 
repression of civil society groups, the military junta has consolidated control over Burma.   
In September 1996, the U.S. Government issued public law 104-208 that 
prohibited bilateral assistance, other than humanitarian and counter-narcotics support, 
imposed conditional sanctions that prohibited new investments in Burma and denial of 
visas to Burmese government officials until such time as Burma makes progress toward 
democratization and market reforms to raise the quality of life of the Burmese people.194  
In July 2003, President Bush signed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003  
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that imposed tougher economic sanctions on Burma.195  The United States seeks political 
transition to a democratically elected government that respects human rights and supports 
democratic governance.196 
3. U.S. Approach to the Asia-Pacific 
In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. Department of Defense 
explicitly stated “of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to 
compete militarily with the United States.”197 This is a dramatic departure from the 
intimation put forth in the 2001 QDR to the outright naming of China as the U.S. next 
adversary.  The United States recognizes that China’s stunning economic rise will likely 
continue along with its accompanying political and military might.  In order to preclude it 
from becoming a strategic rival, the U.S. is engaging China economically at the same 
time as it is developing new military relationships and strengthening existing ones to 
safeguard against any potential military threats.198   
The economies of the United States and the People’s Republic of China are 
inexorably intertwined since the U.S.-China rapprochement.  China accounts for US$285 
billion in two way trade with the United States, making China the third largest U.S. 
trading partner while the U.S. is China’s largest trading partner.199  U.S. exports to China 
from 2000 to 2005 grew by an estimated 160 percent in comparison to only 10 percent 
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growth in export to the rest of the world.200  More and more U.S. firms are now investing 
Mathew Shane Real. “Historical GDP Shares and Growth Rates of GDP Shares for 
Baseline Countries/Regions.” in China to take advantage of low-cost manufacturers at the 
same time the U.S. government is engaging the Chinese government to ensure continued 
economic growth of both countries.  
The Pentagon continues to be wary of Chinese military intentions despite the 
increasing economic relations between the United States and China.  The Chinese 
defense budget has grown by near double digits for more than two decades and the trend 
will not likely abate for the foreseeable future.  Although the U.S. military is preoccupied 
in the Middle East, there is tangible realignment of forces, as well as new security 
arrangements being forged in the region as a deterrent for the expanding influence of the 
Chinese military.   
The Pentagon is expending over US$5 billion in the next several years to expand 
and upgrade the military facilities in Guam to facilitate the redeployment of bombers, 
fighters, submarines, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and other strategic assets to 
shorten the response time from weeks to days in the Asia-Pacific region in case of any 
major contingencies.201  The realignment of U.S. strategic assets include redistribution of 
60 percent of the submarine forces, inclusive of 31 nuclear powered attack submarines, to 
the Pacific Command and the transfer of 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam by 2010 and 
1012 respectively.202  The use of Guam, an American territory, releases the United States 
from any restrictions of foreign governments in the U.S. involvement in future conflicts.   
The United States is realigning the forces in Japan to strengthen the military 
alliance at the same time increase the capabilities of the operational forces.  Camp Zama 
in the Kanakawa Prefecture of Japan is due to receive the I Corp, a force of 
approximately 20,000 active soldiers based in Washington State, to be turned into a U.S.-
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Japan Joint Operational Command by 2008.203  The United States is also in the process 
of deploying the advanced Patriot interceptor missiles to help Japan counter the growing 
missile threats from North Korea and even China.204  This is a stopgap solution until the 
highly touted Missile Defense system becomes a reality in the future.     
The United States continues to reinforce the bilateral relationships with its long 
time allies in the Asia-Pacific.  In South Korea, the United States continues to present a 
significant security deterrent for North Korea.  The U.S. maintains a sizable military 
contingent that continues to train side by side and enhance military cooperation between 
the United States and South Korea.  The United States also maintains good relations with 
Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines, engaging in major annual bilateral exercises 
that foster closer bonds between the militaries and the governments. 
The United States remains wary of China gaining access to naval facilities in 
Burma.  If China gains access to Burma’s naval facilities, the PLAN would be able to 
deploy into the Indian Ocean, upsetting the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.  
In addition to the formal alliances already present in the Asia-Pacific, the United States is 
harnessing other strategic relationships that could aid in restraining China in the long run.  
India is a growing power that could act as a counterbalance to China’s rising influence in 
the region.  As the world’s largest democratic nation, India helps promote free and fair 
trade along with being an economic partner with the United States.  India is also 
possesses a blue-water navy that have expanded bilateral exercises with the Untied 
States.  The U.S. and India recently participated in Cope India, a 2006 exercise that 
represents the largest bilateral air exercise in the past 40 years.205   
The U.S. seeks additional bilateral relationships with other countries, such as 
Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and most other nations that are receptive to overtures 
offered by the United States.  The U.S. is using economic and military aids to attract 
these nations to cooperate with the United States.  At the same time, the Pentagon is 
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aware that many Asia-Pacific nations are wary of siding with either the U.S. or China lest 
they be entangled in a power struggle in the region.   
H.  ANXIETIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC  
The Asia-Pacific region is feeling the increasing strength of China’s economic 
and military power.  With each passing year, China’s GDP continues to grow and finance 
the robust modernization of its armed forces.  China stated that it is following a strategy 
of “peaceful development” and contributes to the stability and prosperity of the region.206  
Due to China’s lack of transparency and the increasing pace of its naval modernization, 
many countries in the region have begun to increase military spending and secure their 
own sea lines of communication.   
India continues to modernize its blue water navy to continue its patrols in the 
Indian Ocean and the surrounding waters.  Japan is wary of China’s intentions and has 
devoted significant attention to modernizing its self-defense forces as well as cultivating 
closer ties with the United States.  South Korea has gained a more independent military 
command structure at the same time continuing to develop its alliance with the United 
States along with closer ties to other regional powers.  Southeast countries are aware they 
cannot begin to match China’s power and are attempting to offset China’s clout in the 
region through influencing Burma.      
Already, the United States is shifting its forces and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific 
to ensure adequate military strength to deal with any contingencies that may arise due to 
China’s rise in the region.  Although China has been adept in engaging its neighbors, the 
PLAN’s access to Burma’s naval facilities could trigger further escalation of military 
buildup in the Asia-Pacific region.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the Asia-Pacific region, China will continue its economic rise for the 
foreseeable future.  The requirement for imported oil will continue to increase, thus 
securing the sea lines of communication will be high on the priority list of the CCP in its 
quest to remain in power.  Currently, Beijing depends on the security provided by the 
United States to allow China’s imported oil to flow unabated.  As China continues to 
grow economically and militarily, the time will come when that security may no longer 
be guaranteed, especially if some of Beijing’s actions are contradictory to the U.S. 
national interests, such as reuniting Taiwan by force.  China’s path to gaining access to 
naval facilities in Burma portends instability that will be detrimental to a more 
prosperous global community.   
A. ACCELERATED REGIONAL MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
The prosperity of the Asia Pacific region hinges on a benign and a relatively 
peaceful environment to foster further economic development.  The United States 
provides freedom of navigation for the region’s sea lines of communication that stems 
from its dominance of the sea.  Although the countries friendly to the United States see 
the Americans as a source of security for the sea lines of communication, China views the 
U.S. naval forces as a source of its vulnerability.  China does not yet have a blue water 
navy capable of escorting the oil tankers along the sea lines of communication but if it 
gains access to naval facilities in Burma, the PLAN will be able to deploy far into the 
Indian Ocean.  The probability is good that China will gain access to Burma’s ports so 
long as the incentives are sufficiently large to entice Burma’s military junta, such as 
additional generous economic and military packages.   
The accelerated modernization of the PLAN, coupled with access to Burma’s 
naval facilities, could hasten the pace of military modernization among the major powers 
of the region in order to protect their own security and economic interests in the region.  
The U.S. allies (South, Korea, and Japan), as well as its friends in the region, can be 
expected to cultivate closer cooperation with the United States to counteract China’s rise 
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in the Asia-Pacific.  More joint exercises that foster greater interoperability between the 
United States and U.S. friendly navies can be expected to increase in the future.   
Asia’s swift economic growth is already enabling the regional states to finance an 
accelerated military modernization, in part to hedge against the rapid rise of China’s 
military power.  With growth in the economy, the real dollar amount dedicated to military 
expenditures increased dramatically as compared to the percent of the country’s GNP.  
Japan maintained its military expenditure at one percent yet the real dollar amount rose 
from US$35.4 billion in 1989 to $44.3 billion in 2005.207  India increased its military 
spending to US$19.9 billion and also acquired new equipment, such as the airborne early 
warning helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles.208  South Korea is increasingly 
modernizing its weapon systems to ensure it can respond to any contingencies, either 
from North Korea or an offshore threat.  In all, the East Asia region increased its military 
expenditures by 71 percent to US$120 billion while South Asia increased by 91 percent 
to $25 billion over a 17-year period.209  If China gains the capability to deploy its naval 
fleet into the Indian Ocean and expand its power projection ability, the regional powers, 
along with the lesser powers, will likely devote much more resources to build up their 
naval forces.  This will diminish the relatively stable environment provided by the United 
States to be supplanted by fear and anxiety over the future security environment of the 
region.     
B. ENGAGING BURMA  
The disquieting trend of regional naval modernization need not accelerate out of 
control due to the likelihood of the PLAN gaining access to the port facilities of Burma.  
As outlined in Chapter II, Beijing does not yet have access to Burmese ports but if its 
influence continues to grow, China will likely acquire the capability to project naval 
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power into the Indian Ocean.  With these added deployments, the chances are good that 
the various navies around the Asia-Pacific may cross paths, adding to the already present 
tension in the region.   
China will continue to grow economically, politically, and militarily well into the 
future.  Thus far, China has been fairly responsible in its interactions with the 
international community.  The Chinese naval modernization is unquestionably focused on 
upgrading antiquated weapon systems and protecting its littorals.  Other uses include 
denying access to outside powers, such as the United States, from interfering with a 
forceful reunification of Taiwan, as well as to gain the ability to protect China’s sea lines 
of communication.  In its current state, the PLA Navy is well equipped to protect its 
littoral and may even be able to deny access to outside powers for a time.  It is unlikely 
the PLAN has the requisite naval power projection capabilities to secure its sea lines of 
communication without the aid of at least one strategically located naval port along its 
extended sea lines of communication.  Burma represents a springboard to extend the 
cruising range of the PLA Navy and Beijing will likely gain access to the Burmese naval 
facilities in the near future in the absence of a counter stratagem from the United States 
and the international community.   
Burma remains a pariah state despite the strides made in its regional and 
international interactions thus pushing the Burmese military junta closer to China for 
even more support.  Rangoon is aware of its dependency on China and already begun to 
diversify, such as cooperating with India and Japan.  The Burmese diversification effort 
is paying off but is progressing at a snail’s pace.  The temptation for Burma is too great to 
gain more aid from China instead of finding more support from the international 
community.  If Burma is given a chance to further diversify without the restrictive 
sanctions imposed by the United States and the Western nations, the chances are strong 
that the overpowering influence of China will be diminished.   
The United States and the regional powers should deal with the new cause of 
potential instability by systematically engaging Burma to stave off China’s design to 
extend its naval reach beyond the South China Sea.  The U.S and the Western nations 
have had over a decade to see if sanctions would work against Burma.  It is clear that 
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sanctions have not worked and it will be wasted efforts and resources for the U.S. and the 
West to continue in this vain.  The tough sanctions have instead hindered other countries 
from gaining the influence to allow the Burmese government better options to choose 
from other than China.   
In light of Burma’s focus as the nexus of instability for the region, the United 
States should disassociate the human rights and democratization requirements and engage 
the military junta to give it more appealing options than granting the PLAN access to its 
naval facilities.  While still pushing for human rights and democratization, concessions 
could be given in exchange for Rangoon’s cooperation in not granting China permission 
to use its naval ports.  Such concessions could be to build up infrastructure and finance 
other public works projects to directly help the people of Burma.  The positive steps 
taken will give hope to the people that have otherwise been suppressed by the 
government.  With the support of the Burmese people, democracy may even be possible 
in the distant future.  Instead of working against Burma, the international community and 
especially the United States, should work with Burma to implement change.   
Working with Burma is just the short-term solution to the larger potential source 
of conflict, the rise of Chinese military naval modernization and its desire to secure its 
own extended sea lines of communication in spite of a stable international order.  China 
represents the rising power with the attendant fears from its neighbors and the world.  
The United States, along with the international community, should further engage China 
to moderate the anxiety of the region and the world.  There are no easy solutions to the 
dilemma of China’s rise.  Only time will tell if China will continue its ‘peaceful 
development’ philosophy or challenge the status quo and risk conflict with the United 
States or other major powers to assert itself as another superpower.   
C. PARTING THOUGHTS 
There is no telling if the People’s Republic of China will continue its economic 
ascendancy to rival the United States or end in a resounding crash due to mounting 
domestic upheavals.  These scenarios are too far in the future to predict but if PLAN 
begins to operate out of Burmese ports, one does not need a crystal ball to realize that 
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regional instability and mutual mistrust will be the outcome.  It will be up to the 
international community to turn a pariah state into a responsible nation that not only helps 
the Burmese people but allows relative stability to continue unabated in the region.   
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